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The ability to quickly and accurately quantify fissile constituents in bulk materials 
remains essential to many aspects of nuclear forensics and for safeguarding nuclear 
materials and operations. This often entails the analysis of trace quantities of nuclear 
debris or effluents, and typically requires bulk sample digestion followed by actinide 
separation and mass spectrometry. Because destructive methods are time and labor 
intensive, efforts have been made to develop alternative nondestructive methods for this 
type of analysis. This work, performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the High 
Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), seeks to utilize delayed neutron activation analysis on 
samples of interest containing multiple fissile constituents. Based on the variances in the 
fission product yields of individual fissile nuclides, this work utilizes methods of linear 
regression to derive a technique that allows for such analysis, forgoing chemical 
separation and using only a single irradiation and counting step.   
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
The continuing development of innovative analytical techniques remains the 
cornerstone of scientific efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and to 
avert malevolent acts of nuclear aggression.  These efforts consist of the collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of nuclear materials and debris.  Current capabilities of the 
scientific community rely too greatly on analytical methods that provide data on 
timescales unacceptable for rapid-decision making.  In light of this perceived deficiency 
in the current state of analytical capabilities, this work formulated a novel, rapid, 
nondestructive analytical method, which would concurrently determine isotopic 
concentrations of multiple fissile nuclides present in special nuclear materials.  To 
establish such a capability, this project revisited the notion that the highly sensitive 
method of delayed neutron activation analysis may in fact be applicable to samples 
containing more than just a single fissile component. 
As nuclear technologies continue to expand in all parts of the world, so increases 
the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  A multinational effort to ensure 
the protection and security of nuclear materials and facilities has been advanced by both 
scientific discoveries and diplomatic initiatives.  Institutional barriers against the 
proliferation of nuclear materials, specifically those implemented by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have led to a myriad of multinational agreements, 
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treaties and increased international cooperation with strides made towards the 
disarmament of nuclear weapons across the globe.  However, concerns over the strength 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have questioned the fortitude 
of nonproliferation policy and the very survival of the current international agreements 
(1) (2).  Taking into account these concerns, as well as recent interest of non-weapons 
states to acquire nuclear arms, and the ever-present threat of a subnational or terrorist 
organization to acquire nuclear material, additional safeguards must be in place in order 
to maintain adequate control of nuclear material and to account for material in the event 
of theft, diversion, or sabotage (3).  In the event that diplomatic efforts fail to prevent the 
diversion of nuclear material by maintaining control and accountability of fissile material 
(4) (5), scientific capabilities are needed to ensure timely attribution.  Whether tasked 
with evaluating processes effluents, interdicted bulk nuclear materials, or debris 
following the detonation of a nuclear weapon, the scientific community is responsible for 
identifying the origin of the nuclear material quickly and accurately.  
Described here is a novel approach to determining fissile isotopic concentrations, 
using a variation of delayed neutron activation analysis. Typical applications of DNAA 
measure the total number of delayed neutrons emitted from an irradiated sample, a 
quantity that is proportional to the concentration of fissile material in a sample.  
However, it will be shown that the masses of individual fissile nuclides can be 
ascertained from a single delayed neutron emission profile of an irradiated sample 
containing multiple fissile components, without chemical separation prior to analysis.   
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1.1 Nuclear Forensics 
Nuclear forensics is a multidisciplinary, multifaceted scientific field tasked with 
the characterization of nuclear materials and the identification of key particularities that 
ultimately allow for the attribution of interdicted materials or sampled debris, as well as 
to decry illicit nuclear operations (6) (7).  Bulk quantities of illicit nuclear materials have 
been intercepted at an alarming rate since the fall of former Soviet Union, indicating that 
an illegal market of stolen nuclear material exists today (8).  Aside from these intercepted 
bulk materials, trace and ultra-trace concentrations of nuclear materials are often 
collected by environmental sampling techniques.  The IAEA has implemented protocols 
to routinely monitor the controlled and uncontrolled releases of gaseous and aerosolized 
particulate matter from nuclear facilities as a safeguards verification technique (9) (10). 
The small quantities of particulate matter released during nuclear activities are collected 
by IAEA inspectors, primarily by swiping the surfaces of nuclear processing facilities.  
The bulk analysis of these samples containing trace amounts of nuclear materials is an 
especially important deterrent to state-sponsored undisclosed nuclear actions (11).  The 
remote and onsite environmental sampling and subsequent sampling of nuclear facilities 
around the world remains a primary method of the IAEA’s efforts to monitor and 
safeguard nuclear activities; the auditing of nuclear fuel processing, reprocessing, and 
enrichment facilities helps to ensure treaty compliance and to uncover clandestine 
operations.    
Nuclear materials are characterized by their physical morphology (12), chemical 
composition (13), trace element contamination (14), isotopic composition (15), and many 
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other characteristics.  However, the fundamental characteristic of any nuclear material is 
the concentration and isotopic ratios of its fissile components.  Therefore, the ability to 
quickly and accurately quantify and characterize the fissile constituents in bulk nuclear 
materials is paramount to the safeguarding of nuclear materials, and to ensure the 
compliance of nuclear facilities. 
 Both large quantities of special nuclear material, and trace quantities collected in 
routine sampling efforts require destructive analytical methods for the determination of 
isotopic concentrations of the fissile nuclides present in the material.  Consequently, this 
analysis, while very sensitive, often proves to be difficult and time-consuming task, as it 
involves chemical destruction and actinide separation for routine analysis (16) (17). 
 
 
1.2 Current Analytical Methods 
A limitation of the current analytical techniques is the inherently difficult nature 
of destructive analysis of nuclear materials, which often entails mass spectrometry 
preceded by extensive sample preparation. On one hand, mass spectrometric techniques 
remain the gold-standard today, however, these methods are time consuming and 
scenarios exist in which rapid decisions must be made regarding responsive actions, 
based on the composition and origin of the collected materials.  Consequently, efforts 
have been made to develop alternative or complementary methods for the simultaneous 
quantification of uranium and transuranic nuclides within a given sample.  It is therefore 
proposed that an analytical method utilizing DNAA be established as a method of 
 5 
providing a baseline assessment of the concentrations of different fissile constituents 
present in a given sample.  Ultimately, this will prove to be an invaluable technique that 
allows for accurate, yet timely, evaluation of nuclear materials.  Because DNAA is not 
sensitive to matrix interferences (18) that other analytical techniques, including the mass-
interferences that hinder mass spectrometric analysis, this technique will be well suited 
for both environmental samples and the assay of large quantities of intercepted illicit 
nuclear materials.  A large neutron source, however, is required. 
 Delayed neutron activation analysis is a process in which neutron irradiation 
induces fission in the fissile constituents of a given sample.  The neutron-rich fission 
products decay via the βn-mechanism and the fissile contents are quantified by the 
emission rate of the delayed neutrons.  It is a long-established analytical technique; 
delayed neutron counting experiments date as far back as the late 1940’s (19).  Because 
DNAA is able to provide a fast, nondestructive method of determining trace-level fissile 
materials, regardless of the sample medium, it is used today with great success for a 
multitude of applications, including the determination of uranium content in 
environmental samples (20).  Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in using 
DNAA in the field of nuclear forensics, as it is recognized as a rapid alternative to other 
analytical methods including mass spectrometry and alpha spectroscopy (21). 
However, DNAA is not currently applied to the analysis of materials containing 
two or more fissile nuclides because this technique fails to differentiate between fission 
caused by different nuclides.  This is especially problematic for samples of interest that 
contain derivatives of discharged nuclear fuel containing fissile isotopes of both uranium 
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and plutonium.   This work seeks to utilize DNAA to quantify multiple fissile nuclide 
systems without the sample preparation or chemical separation that hinders other 
techniques by exploiting the subtle differences in the βn-decay of fission products of 
different nuclides.  This will ultimately allow for the deconvolution of the time-
dependent neutron spectrum following sample irradiation.   
 
 
1.3 Motivation 
The primary motivation for this work, particularly at the onset of this project, was 
to address the analytical needs in determining isotopic concentrations of materials 
collected by environmental sampling efforts.  One of the primary tasks of the Neutron 
Analysis Laboratory at the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) is to evaluate 
environmental swipe samples collected by the IAEA at nuclear materials processing 
facilities.  These swipe samples provide valuable insight to the processes conducted at a 
facility and are paramount in the assurance of treaty compliance and the deterrence of 
illicit or covert operations.  In particular, these swipes determine the isotopic 
concentrations of fissile 235U to ensure that uranium is not being enriched to levels greater 
than declared limits.  The current capabilities of the DNAA facility at HFIR and at other 
laboratories over the world are limited by the fact that current applications of DNAA 
cannot be used if more than a single fissile nuclide is present in the sample.  If any of 
these materials contained a fissile component in addition to the uranium collected, the 
resultant measurements would be false.  Additionally, it behooves the scientific 
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community to develop technologies to identify instances when more one fissile material 
is collected via swipe sampling, as this would indicate undeclared spent fuel reprocessing 
or other nuclear process.  By developing a method that can identify secondary or tertiary 
fissile nuclides collected by IAEA swipe sampling, covert nuclear materials processes 
can be quickly and easily identified.   
 As this work progressed, the need for a nondestructive method of evaluating the 
fissile constituents of nuclear materials became increasingly apparent because of the 
potential breadth of information that could be gained from the analysis.  Many of the 
basic characteristics of a nuclear material can be ascertained simply by the presence and 
relative concentrations of 235U and 239Pu.  These fissile isotopes are of primary interest 
and greatest concern from a nonproliferation and nuclear forensics aspect because of their 
potential for direct-use in nuclear weapons.   
 Applications of a direct method of measuring the 239Pu/235U ratio in trace 
concentrations of nuclear material primarily include the analysis of materials actively or 
passively collected for nuclear safeguards practices.  In addition to measuring isotopic 
ratios in swipe collections taken at uranium enrichment facilities to ensure compliancy, 
debris and process effluents collected via wide-area monitoring can be analyzed for 239Pu 
contaminants to identify nuclear fuels separations or reprocessing facilities.  Further still, 
this method would be of great value in the event of a nuclear accident, where the 
characterization of nuclear contaminants must be performed quickly and for a large 
number of collected materials. 
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1.4 Scope of Work 
Because DNAA is a powerful nondestructive analytical method, with the 
capability to quantifying fissile material on the sub-nanogram level in a matter of 
minutes, without chemical or preparation or separation, described here is a method, 
which will allow for the concurrent determination of multiple fissile nuclides.  This will 
broaden the applicability of DNAA to the assay of materials from all stages of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. 
 In order to develop a method that allows for samples containing two or more 
fissile constituents to be analyzed, the time-evolution of the delayed neutron emission 
profile of an irradiated material had to be considered.  Each fissile nuclide has a unique 
fission product yield.  Because of the differences in fission products, and their half-lives, 
of different fissile nuclides, each fissile nuclide has a unique delayed neutron emission 
profile.  By empirically developing explanatory functions, or basis functions, that 
describe the time-dependent delayed neutron emission profile per unit mass for each 
individual fissile nuclide of interest, methods of linear regression were used to 
deconvolve the delayed neutron spectrum of a sample containing multiple fissile 
nuclides.   
The experimental work performed to establish this technique consisted of first 
building an appropriate neutron counting system.  The Neutron Activation Analysis 
Laboratory at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is routinely used for the analysis 
of a broad spectrum of samples, including IAEA swipe samples that are analyzed for 
uranium content and enrichment using a combination of DNAA and neutron activation 
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analysis (NAA) with subsequent gamma-ray spectrometry; however, before the onset of 
this project, the system was not capable of resolving a time-dependent neutron spectrum.  
Therefore, several modifications were made to the existing counting system at HFIR.  
These included the replacement of many analog components and the installation of a 
computer-interfaced multichannel scaler.  A thorough description of the system and the 
improvements made is provided in a Chapter 5 of this paper. 
Once these enhancements to the neutron counting system were made, samples 
were prepared for irradiation by diluting standard reference materials that contained 
certified uranium and plutonium isotopic concentrations.   
Samples were irradiated using the 85 MW High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at 
ORNL.  HFIR was advantageous for two primary reasons.  First, the immense neutron 
flux, 4x1013 n.cm-2s-1 in the irradiation position, allowed for a greater reaction rate and 
more induced fissions.  Second, the irradiation position has a large thermal to fast flux 
ratio.  This nearly thermal flux minimized any fast-neutron induced fission reactions of 
other nuclides, which would skew the results if not adequately accounted.   
The bulk of this work came in terms of the data analysis and the ultimate 
quantification of each contributing fissile nuclide to the single acquired delayed neutron 
spectrum.  A multi-element regression model was chosen to describe the delayed neutron 
emission profile following thermal irradiation of a sample containing multiple fissile 
nuclides.  The detector response could then be expressed as an array of discrete neutron 
counts at a series of time steps.  Consequently, the regression model could be used to 
determine the concentrations of each fissile nuclide present, providing that the predicted 
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detector response at each time step for each nuclide was known.  This predicted response 
was then modeled as a basis vector.  Isotopically certified reference materials were used 
to empirically characterize these basis vectors. Using linear regression techniques, the 
masses of each contributing nuclide were then found. 
 With a nondestructive method to concurrently measure multiple fissile nuclides, 
this work sought to characterize the method and the system in place at ORNL.  
Experiments were conducted to evaluate and optimize lower limits of detection and to 
improve the fidelity of the collective parametric quantities empirically found in the 
regression model. 
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Chapter 2 
 Isotope Ratio Analysis: A Literature Review 
 
While the field of nuclear forensics employs a wide variety of analytical methods 
to determine the physical, chemical, and radiological properties of special nuclear 
materials and their derivatives, the isotopic ratio analysis of these materials remains the 
pinnacle of all forensics efforts.  These ratios can be used to positively identify the origin 
and history of a nuclear material; specifically, by focusing on the isotopic analysis of the 
uranium and plutonium nuclides present in a sample, the source material can be defined 
(22). 
 Analyzing the isotopic ratios of actinides present in a sample can shed light on 
numerous forensics questions regarding the material.  These ratios can be used to 
attribute illicit materials (23) (24) (25), to analyze environmental samples for safeguards 
purposes (26) (27), or the assay of discharged nuclear fuel (28) (29) (30).  Additionally, 
these ratios can be used to analyze debris following a detonation or nuclear accident (31). 
 The focus of this work is on the isotopic ratio analysis of special nuclear materials 
(SNM).  As defined by both the IAEA and the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
special nuclear materials are those that pose grave risks in regards to their attractiveness 
for proliferation.  Specifically, these materials are those containing quantities of 
plutonium and/or uranium enriched in either 233U or 235U fissile isotopes.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to give an overview of isotopic ratio analysis, its applications, and its 
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importance in the characterization of special nuclear materials.  An assessment of the 
current capabilities to perform such work is also offered. 
 
 
2.1 Actinide Ratios of Significance 
Isotope ratio analysis is a pillar of nuclear forensics efforts.  It is used to identify 
materials and processes that can ultimately be used for the attribution of nuclear materials 
and debris.  Current methods of isotope ratio analysis of nuclear materials consider not 
only key actinides for identification of specific nuclear processes parameters, but also 
trace isotopes, which can provide insight to the geographical origins of a material.  The 
delayed neutron activation analysis developed in this work technique cannot, and even 
after extensive refinements, will not, be able to quantify more than a select few nuclides.  
While this is a disadvantage in comparison to mass spectrometry, the few nuclides that 
DNAA is capable of determining can provide a wealth of valuable information pertaining 
to the origin and intended use of a given nuclear material on a timescale much quicker 
than destructive analytical methods.   
The importance of actinide ratio analysis can be realized at nearly every point of 
the nuclear fuel cycle.  A fast, accurate method of determining these isotopic ratios can 
ultimately be used for many practical purposes, pursuant to the proper handling, safe 
storage, and security of nuclear materials.  Precisely which ratios are important and what 
practical information can be ascertained from these measurements will be discussed 
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below, bearing particular importance to ratios that serve as radio “fingerprints” that can 
be used to identify specific chemical or nuclear processes. 
 The nuclear fuel cycle can be discretized into three major components: the front 
end, the service period, and the back end.  During each period, the composition of the 
nuclear material drastically changes.  Actinide compositions of nuclear material can be a 
strong indicator as to a material’s intended use and the processes used to create it.  
Consequently, actinide ratios can be used to determine the origin of an unknown material, 
or to monitor the processes used to formulate them. 
 Special nuclear material is introduced into the fuel cycle during uranium 
enrichment.  In an effort to prevent nuclear proliferation, the IAEA routinely monitors the 
production of enriched uranium and to identify clandestine operations at enrichment 
facilities.  The isotopic ratios of enriched uranium, uranium tails, and process effluents 
serve as an indicator of treaty compliance.  The detection of covert HEU production 
remains the primary safeguards objective at any enrichment facility (32) and 
environmental sampling is the preferred method of collection to ensure that highly 
enriched uranium is not being produced.   Particulates formed by the hydrolysis of UF6 
released during normal operations (33) are collected by inspectors and analyzed for 
isotopic signatures.  The 235U/238U, which can be found by delayed neutron activation 
analysis followed by gamma-spectroscopy, is the primary indicator of clandestine highly 
enriched uranium production at nuclear facilities 
 During the service period of the nuclear fuel cycle, plutonium is introduced into 
the material matrix.  239Pu production, by neutron capture of 238U, provides a wealth of 
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information pertaining to many reactor specific parameters, including burn up and initial 
fuel composition.  Interdicted material, which had been intentionally diverted from 
discharged nuclear fuel, could potentially be traced back to a specific reactor design using 
actinide ratios.  Concurrently uranium and plutonium measurements can provide several 
isotopic ratios of significance and identify material that has been derived from the service 
period of the nuclear fuel cycle.  The 239Pu/235U and 241Pu/235U ratios identify burnup 
parameters that can be used to characterize an illicit material.  The determination of other 
trace fissile Am and Cm nuclides can also be used to identify specific reactor types or 
initial fuel composition, all of which can provide clues as to the origin of an interdicted 
material.  Additionally, because of the short half-life of 241Pu, the 241Pu/239Pu ratio can be 
used to easily date an unknown plutonium-bearing material.  
 Finally, debris and effluents can be collected and categorized using fissile isotope 
measurements.  Currently, atmospheric sampling is used to detect clandestine nuclear 
fuel separation and reprocessing facilities.  Using aerosol samplers, collections are made 
over long periods of time (on the order of weeks or longer) to collect effluents that may 
have been released during operations within 100 km (34).  As such, uranium and 
plutonium isotopic ratios are used to differentiate effluents from atmospheric fallout.  In 
the event of a nuclear detonation or large-scale nuclear accident, plutonium isotopic 
ratios can be used in the attribution of a material, but can also be used to determine the 
yield of a nuclear detonation. 
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2.2 Determination of Isotopic Ratios 
Uranium and plutonium isotopic ratio analysis, particularly in sample sets 
containing trace amounts of material, is most commonly performed using one form of 
mass spectrometry or another.  First, a brief overview of this form of analysis follows, 
while details of the current techniques are described in subsequent pages. 
 The basic components of all mass spectrometry instruments include an ionization 
source, an extraction method, a mass-to-charge separator, and a detector system.  The 
fundamental premise is that once ions are formed and injected into a mass analyzer, 
atoms or molecules can be separated spatially or temporally by their respective mass-to-
charge ratio (35).  The ions are collected by a detector array according to these separation 
parameters and quantitative measurements to the relative abundances of each charged 
particle can be made.  Of the techniques discussed in greater detail, these methods vary 
primarily with respect to the method of ionization.  Generally speaking, mass 
spectrometry is a very powerful technique and can be used to determine isotopic 
abundances of very minute quantities of material. 
The current state-of-the art methods for the determination of isotopic ratios of 
actinides present in a given material include several mass spectrometric techniques, such 
as inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS), high-efficiency thermal 
ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), resonance ionization mass spectrometry (RIMS, or 
accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43).  These 
techniques are discussed in greater detail below, but it should be noted that all of these 
methods require sample destruction and actinide separation prior to analysis.  While these 
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methods provide great sensitivity and high precision, they are limited by the time-
consuming sample preparation.  It has been suggested here and in the literature (44) (27) 
that time required for material collection and subsequent destructive analysis does not 
meet the timeliness criterion currently implemented by the IAEA for the detection of 
illicit materials production. 
 Thermal ionization mass spectrometry entails heating a chemically purified 
sample on a filament to the point of thermal desorption and ionization.  While TIMS 
yields highly precise measurements, thermal ionization does not break apart molecular 
interferences as effectively as other ionization methods.  As such TIMS is particularly 
susceptible to hydrocarbon interferences, limiting its applicability of analyzing mixed 
uranium and plutonium samples (45).  Once the actinides are separated from the sample 
matrix and analyzed, TIMS provides uranium detection limits on the order of 10 
femtograms (46). 
 Resonance ionization mass spectrometry assuages many isobaric interferences, 
particularly in mixed actinide materials by using narrow bandwidth lasers to ionize and 
excite specific nuclides.  Because individual elements have unique, discrete ionization 
energies, a finely tuned laser can be used to ionize only the analyte of interest.  Results of 
this method show greater precision and accuracy for the determination of U and Pu (47) 
(48) than other spectrometric techniques using more traditional ionization sources. 
 Accelerator mass spectrometry has also been shown to be on the cutting edge of 
uranium and plutonium isotopic analysis, due to its low susceptibility to matrix 
interferences (49).  By using a tandem electrostatic accelerator to accelerate ions and 
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dissociate atoms, isotopic, isobaric, and molecular interferences are reduced by several 
orders of magnitude (50).  Detection limits have been shown to be on the order of 106 
atoms for plutonium analysis (51).  Similar results have been shown for uranium 
isotopics as well. 
Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry is one of the most widely used 
mass spectrometric techniques used today.  Atomization and ionization is achieved by 
introducing the analyte to a high temperature plasma, which dissociates molecules and 
generate M+ or M2+ ions.  Detection limits for uranium and plutonium have been found to 
be on the order of 10-11 grams using ICP-MS; detection limits are improved by several 
orders of magnitude by introducing a multi-collector detection system to mitigate 
interferences.   
There are of course methods alternative to mass spectrometry used today, albeit 
not with similar frequency.  Nondestructive methods, such as passive gamma-ray 
spectrometry, are continually being investigated to serve as a viable method for uranium 
and plutonium isotopic analysis.  However, because of the weak radioactivity of uranium 
and plutonium nuclides, even the most sensitive gamma-ray spectrometry systems are 
severely limited by necessary count times and sample mass.  Alpha particle spectroscopy 
is also sometimes used for the determination of plutonium nuclides.  However, sample 
preparation, which entails all of the destruction and chemical separation needed for mass 
spectrometry plus additional steps to create ultra-thin sample deposits to avoid self-
shielding of the alpha particles, make this technique unappealing for most applications. 
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Finally, of course, there is delayed neutron activation analysis.  DNAA has been 
utilized for more than half a century for the determination of 235U in a variety of sample 
matrices.  If followed by gamma-ray spectroscopy of the activated sample, 235U/238U 
ratios can be measured without the need for destructive sample preparation. This 
implementation of DNAA is routinely used at the Neutron Irradiation Facility at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory and at facilities around the world.  A variety of uranium-
bearing samples, including IAEA environmental sampling swipes, are analyzed with this 
method; however, this approach fails if the analyte contain multiple fissile components.  
There has been speculation as to whether DNAA could potentially be modified to analyze 
samples containing more than one fissile constituent.  To date, though, only a single 
paper has been published claiming to have successfully quantified samples containing 
two fissile components using delayed neutron activation analysis.  Li, Henkelmann, and 
Baumgartner in Munich utilized the delayed neutron counting system at the FRM-II 
reactor to quantify binary mixtures of 235U and 239Pu (66).  There are several similarities 
with the work performed at ORNL and this paper; however, several basic differences are 
also apparent.  The similarities are discussed below, as are, more importantly, the key 
differences.  The limited scope of the Li paper represents only a part of the work 
performed for this project. 
 The theory behind using delayed neutron activation analysis for the quantification 
of multiple fissile nuclides, as presented by Li, Henkelmann, and Baumgartner is 
remarkably similar to the theoretical explanation offered in Chapter 3 of this work.  In 
short, both acknowledge that due to the different fission product yields for each fissile 
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nuclide, a unique time-dependent neutron emission profile can be produced following 
material irradiation.  In addition, the Li et al. work too suggests that the measured 
delayed neutron emission profile can be somehow deconvoluted to quantify each 
contributing fissile component. 
 Li, Henkelmann, and Baumgartner performed irradiations at the FRM-II reactor, 
which has a thermal neutron flux several orders of magnitude less than that of the 
irradiation position used at HFIR for this work.  The remaining experimental conditions 
were also similar, as both this work and theirs utilized a delayed neutron counting array 
of 3He detectors and a multichannel scaler to acquire a usable neutron decay spectrum.  
However, the projects differ in the subsequent analysis of the neutron signal.  The paper 
is quite ambiguous in terms of describing the methodology used to deconvolve the 
delayed neutron spectrum, but it seems that Li, Henkelmann, and Baumgartner took a sort 
of “curve fitting” approach where the neutron emission rate was fit to a curve of the form: C = Xe!!! + Ye!!!        (1) 
where X and Y are the masses of each contributing fissile constituent and the 
exponentials are constants in some time domain acquired by irradiating 1 µg samples of 
each 239Pu and 235U.   
 While this “curve fitting” technique showed promising results for some of the 
higher-concentration binary mixtures, the Li et al. method of analysis was insufficient 
and generally lacking.  This is certainly evident by the 20% errors quoted by the authors, 
which they over-simplistically attributed to “counting statistics”.  Li, Henkelmann, and 
Baumgartner seem to demonstrate that simply fitting the delayed neutron curve is a poor 
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technique that ultimately breaks down at low concentrations of fissile material.  Further, 
the method of analysis would not be feasible to apply to materials that contain more than 
two fissile materials.  
 
2.3 Conclusions 
 There is a wide range of analytical tools available to the nuclear forensics scientist 
for the analysis of nuclear materials.  The physical, chemical, and radiological 
characteristics of a given nuclear material are all of great importance in the analysis of 
nuclear materials.  Physical properties, such as surface morphology and structure are 
determined using a number of microscopic instruments, including optical microscopy and 
high resolution scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and transmission electron 
microscopy (TEM) (52) (53).  Radiological properties are often surveyed by way of 
gamma-ray spectrometry and alpha spectrometry (54) (55).  Chemical compositions are 
determined a number of different ways, using energy-dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) 
for example (3).  However, it is the advent of high-resolution mass spectrometric 
techniques that have allowed for the precise measurements of chemical and isotopic 
compositions of nuclear materials (56).  Currently, the choice method in fissile isotope 
quantification in special nuclear materials remains inorganic mass spectrometric 
techniques; ICP-MS is currently one of the single most powerful tools for nuclear 
forensic applications (3).  
Inorganic mass spectrometry is used often in both the determination of trace 
amounts of material in environmental samples (57), as well as to determine isotopic ratios 
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in bulk nuclear materials (58).  The challenges of mass spectrometric techniques arise in 
the required sample preparation associated with the destructive chemical separations 
performed prior to analysis.  In order to quantify actinides in either bulk nuclear material 
or trace-concentrations collect by way of environmental sampling, the process beings 
with the destruction of both the sample material and its collection matrix (59).  This 
process is of course matrix-dependent, but for many instances involves the dry ashing of 
the sample.  Acid digestion and then evaporation typically follows.  Actinide separation 
is carried out by any number of methods; resin columns are common.  The actinide 
concentrations are then determined by one of several high-precision instruments.  Today, 
multi-collector inductively coupled plasma MS (MC-ICP-MS) and thermal ionization 
mass spectrometry (TIMS) offer the greatest sensitivities.   
 Mass spectrometry remains at the forefront of both research and application for 
the assay of nuclear materials.  However, there remain limitations with regard to mass 
spectrometric techniques, and therefore there is great interest in novel approaches that 
could complement the existing destructive analytical methods. 
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Chapter 3 
 Basics of Delayed Neutron Activation Analysis 
 
Delayed neutrons have been studied extensively since the 1940’s due to their 
significance in nuclear chain reactions and nuclear reactor kinetics.  Delayed neutrons 
have also been used for decades in the radioanalysis of fissile materials.  While the 
underlying theory governing the proposed analysis may be unremarkable, it is the 
concurrent determination and quantification of multiple fissile nuclides that remains a 
novel and arduous task.   
 
 
3.1 Neutron Activation Analysis 
Neutron activation analysis can be summarized as a three step analytical process 
involving sample preparation, irradiation, and activation-product counting. 
 The samples of greatest analytical interest to this work are those taken from 
environmental swipe sampling.  The IAEA uses environmental swipes as an integral part 
of routine inspections, and environmental swipes are a key forensic sampling method of 
nuclear materials (11).  The primary motivating factor in employing delayed neutron 
counting for this work, as opposed to the commonly used destructive analytical 
techniques, is of course the benefit of sample preparation.  In this light, this work will 
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forgo any sort of actinide concentration, which typically involves ashing of the sample 
followed by chemical dissolution (60). 
Samples were prepared at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using methods 
consistent with swipes collected by IAEA environmental sampling efforts.  Samples of 
varying actinide composition were made in order to validate the method.  Minimally, 
samples were prepared in such a manner that they contained variable concentrations of 
235U, 238U, and 239Pu. Sample irradiations were performed at ORNL using the onsite 
irradiation capabilities at HFIR.  HFIR is a light water moderated, 85 MW reactor, which 
uses highly enriched uranium fuel.  Consequently, HFIR provides one of the highest 
neutron fluxes of any research reactor in the world, and as such.  Its thermal neutron flux 
of 4.0 x 1013 n.cm-2.s-1 allows for increased fission rates, and accordingly, greater fission 
product activation relative to other irradiation facilities.  To increase the sensitivity of the 
delayed neutron counting, and thus achieve the lowest limits of detection, it is necessary 
to maximize the number of product precursor nuclides.  The production rate of precursor 
nuclides is proportional to the fission rate of the sample (61). 
 𝑃 = !! 1− 𝑒!!"         (2) 
where  
λ is the decay constant of the precursor nuclide 
t is the length of time that the sample is irradiated 
R is the fission reaction given as 
 𝑅 = !!!! 𝜎!𝜙         (3) 
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where 
m is the mass of the fissile constituent 
NA is Avogadro’s number 
M is the atomic mass number of the fissile nuclide 
σf is the thermal fission cross-section 
ϕ is the thermal neutron activation flux 
 It is necessary to irradiate samples long enough to allow for adequate saturation 
of fission products before counting; as evident by Equations 2 and 3, the large thermal 
neutron flux provided in the HFIR irradiation facility increases the production rate of the 
delayed neutron precursors by more than an order of magnitude when compared to the 
activation of a sample in a 1 MW research reactor (62).  It is also important to note that 
the irradiation position in HFIR is within its beryllium reflector, providing a nearly totally 
thermal neutron flux.  Because there are only about 157 delayed neutrons released per 104 
fission events (63), it is important to be able to increase the number of fission events as 
much as possible in order to acquire the most detailed βn signal for neutron counting.  
Neutron activation analysis at HFIR is facilitated by two pneumatic transfer 
systems, PT-1 and PT-2.  PT-2 was utilized for this work, as the transfer system 
terminates at the automated delayed-neutron counting array.  The counting system 
consists of 18 3He neutron detectors to count isotropically emitted neutrons in the 2π 
direction.  The sample transfer time between its irradiation position and counting position 
is roughly 2.5 seconds, which precludes analysis of the first delayed neutron group, 
according to the six-group approximation. 
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3.2 Delayed Neutrons 
During a nuclear fission event, several free neutrons are released.  Those neutrons 
released within 10-13 seconds of the splitting of the nucleus, are termed prompt neutrons.  
Delayed neutrons, however, are the result of fission products undergoing neutron 
emission associated with β-decay.  The β-decay of the precursor nuclide leaves the 
radiogenic daughter product in an energy state higher than that of the neutron binding 
energy, thus causing the emission of a neutron.  The first delayed neutrons begin to 
appear at roughly 10-1 seconds following fission, but most precursor nuclides have 
considerable half-lives; consequently, most delayed neutrons take considerably longer to 
appear.  Of the hundreds of nuclides formed following the fission of actinides, there are 
roughly 40 fission products, of varying half-lives, that decay via βn-decay (64).   
 Due to the increasing neutron:proton ratio as a function of increasing atomic 
number, the atomic fragments following fission are almost always neutron rich.  As such, 
these fission products undergo β-decay at a rate proportional to their deviation from 
nuclear stability.  Following β-decay the daughter product exists at some energy, equal to 
Qβ, above its ground state.  If Qβ is greater than the binding energy of the neutron, Sn, 
then the nuclide may undergo subsequent neutron emission, as illustrated below in Figure 
1.   
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Fig. 1. Energy diagram of delayed neutron precursor 
followed by delayed-neutron emission (63) 
 
The probability that a particular nuclide will emit a neutron as a result of βn-decay is 
proportional to 
Qβ-Sn          (4) 
 As will be seen, the number of delayed neutrons emitted following the irradiation 
of a fissile material is proportional to the initial concentration of fissile nuclides.  This is 
the basis for delayed neutron activation analysis. 
 
 
3.3 Delayed Neutron Activation Analysis 
Delayed neutron activation analysis is routinely performed at the Neutron 
Irradiation Facility at ORNL, and several other facilities across the world, for the 
determination of 235U in a variety of matrices, including environmental swipe samples.   
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Classically, DNAA uses a comparator method to quantify the concentration of 
235U in a given sample by irradiating a known standard and counting the total number of 
delayed neutrons emitted from the sample for a prescribed length of time.  Under 
identical irradiation and counting parameters, the ratio of the number of neutrons emitted 
from the unknown sample to the known sample can be used to determine the mass of the 
235U present. 
 While this implementation of DNAA has been well suited for quantifying fissile 
uranium in a wide range of materials, with detection limits on the order of picograms 
without the need for chemical preparation or separation, the comparator method fails if 
the sample has multiple fissile nuclides present.  This stipulation limits the applicability 
of DNAA in the field of nuclear forensics, where samples may contain multiple fissile 
nuclides including 235U, 239Pu, as well as heavier fissile plutonium nuclides and some 
americium and curium nuclides.  
Fundamentally, delayed neutron counting measures the neutron emission from a 
given sample as a function of time.  The number of neutrons emitted from a sample is 
proportional to the number of fission products formed, which is to say that the initial 
concentration of fissile material can be determined by the number of delayed neutrons 
counted.  The neutron intensity as a function of time can be described as the summation 
of the decay of the neutron precursor. 𝑠 = 𝑛! 𝜈!!𝜆!𝑒!!!!!!!!        (5) 
where 
N is the number of delayed neutron precursors 
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nf is the number of atoms that undergo fission in a sample 
λ is the precursor group constant 
 
Rarely are delayed neutrons counted in such a manner, but rather are grouped 
depending on the half-life of each delayed neutron precursor.  Equation 5 can be vastly 
simplified by using the six-group delayed neutron model to describe the total neutron 
source rate.  By doing so, equation 5 can be written as follows 
 𝑠 = 𝑛! 𝜈!!𝜆!𝑒!!!!!!!!        (6) 
where 
νd is the delayed neutron fraction of each delayed neutron precursor group 
The summation is taken over the number of groups, typically six, as is shown in equation 
6.   
 The delayed neutron yield varies depending on the nuclide undergoing fission.  
Table 1 summarizes the total and delayed neutron yield of nuclides, which undergo 
thermal fission and are of particular interest to this work.  The delayed neutron fraction is 
defined as simply the ratio of delayed neutrons to the total number of neutrons emitted 
during fission. 
 𝛽 = !"#$%"!  !"#$%&!'!"#$%"!  !"#$%&!'!!"#$!%  !"#$%&!'      (7) 
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Table 1. Neutron yields of key fission precursors. Adapted from (65) 
Nuclide Total Neutron 
Yield 
Delayed-Neutron 
Yield 
Delayed-Neutron 
Fraction 
235U 2.4355 +/- 0.0023 0.0162 +/- 0.0005 0.0066 
239Pu 2.8836 +/- 0.0047 0.0065 +/- 0.0003 0.0022 
  
The delayed neutron groups are characterized in the six-group model by their respective 
half-lives. The half-lives of the precursor groups range from roughly 0.2 s to 55 s.  Figure 
2, below, shows the time-dependent decay of the individual precursor groups following 
the thermal irradiation of 235U. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Decay of six precursor groups of 235U   
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The differences in fission product yield and consequently differences in delayed 
neutron precursor groups for the above mentioned nuclides are summarized below.  
These differences will be exploited in order to simultaneously quantify unique fissile 
nuclides in samples using delayed neutron counting. 
 
Table 2. Delayed neutron group parameters 
Group Average Half-life [s] Delayed Neutron Fraction [%] 
 239Pu 235U 239Pu 235U 
1 54.28 55.72 0.0072 0.0210 
2 23.04 22.72 0.0626 0.1400 
3 5.60 6.22 0.0444 0.1260 
4 2.13 2.30 0.0685 0.2520 
5 0.62 0.61 0.0180 0.0740 
6 0.26 0.23 0.0093 0.0270 
 
 
With the above group parameters, an expression of the total delayed neutron source rate 
can be given as the sum of the delayed neutron source rates of each fissile nuclide present 
in the sample as 
 𝑠! = 𝑛!!!!!! 𝜈!!"!!!! 𝜆!"𝑒!!!"!        (8) 
where  
N is the number of fissile constituents present in the sample 
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𝑛!!is the number of atoms, of isotope i, which undergo fission 𝜈!!"is the delayed neutron yield, in the kth decay group, of nuclide i 𝜆!" is the decay constant of the kth decay group, of nuclide i 
 The difference in the neutron group parameters correlates to each fissile nuclide 
producing a different-shaped delayed neutron intensity profile.  These individual neutron 
intensity-time curves are the consequence of variances in fission product yields in the 
precursor groups. 
 
 
3.4 Spectra Formulation 
 The time-dependent neutron counting rate can be expressed as 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝜀 !!!!! 𝜎!𝜙(1− 𝑒!!!!!)!!!! 𝜈!!"!!!! 𝜆!"𝑒!!!"!!   (9) 
where 
ε is the neutron counting efficiency 
m is the mass of the ith fissile  
NA is Avogadro’s number 
M is the atomic mass number of the ith fissile nuclide 
σf is the fission cross-section 
ϕ is the thermal neutron activation flux 
Equation 9 can be expressed as the count rate per unit mass, P(t), multiplied by the mass 
of the constituent nuclide (66). 
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 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃!(𝑡) ∙𝑚!!!!!        (10) 
The detector response, c(t), can be thought of as the sum of a series of points given as 
 𝑐! = 𝑐 𝑡! ± 𝛿/2         (11) 
where  
δ is the detector dwell time. 
Of course, by reducing δ, the efficiency of the detector system increases and the delayed 
neutron counting statistics improve proportionally.  The detector response at a given 
point, ci, is total neutrons from the βn-decay of precursor nuclides from the fission of 
each fissionable nuclide present in the sample. 
 𝑐! = 𝑐! + 𝑐! + 𝑐! …+ 𝑐!       (12) 
where subscripts α, β, γ,…, ω are contributing fissionable nuclides 
Equation 12 can be expressed in terms of its count rate per unit mass for each nuclide, as 
was done above. 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! + 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! + 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! +⋯+ 𝑃!(𝑡! ± 𝛿) ∙𝑚! (13) 
For a sample initially containing four basis functions, which include the four possible 
fissile constituents in the sample, the detector response at point ci would be given by the 
following expression. 
 𝑐! = 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! + 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! + 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! + 𝑃!(𝑡! ± 𝛿) ∙𝑚! (14) 
The total count rate of the neutron detector can be expressed as a linear combination of 
points c1 to ci.  This is best represented in the following matrix. 
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 𝑐!⋮𝑐!⋮𝑐! =
𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃!(𝑡! ± 𝛿)⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃!(𝑡! ± 𝛿)⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 𝑃!(𝑡! ± 𝛿) ∙
𝑚!𝑚!𝑚!𝑚!  (15) 
𝑪 = (𝑷𝜶,𝑷𝜷,𝑷𝜸,𝑷𝜹, ) ∙𝑴       (16) 
 
The parameters Pi are known from the empirically derived basis functions, which 
individually contribute to the count spectrum; C is the neutron intensity-time profile, 
which is measured experimentally.  Using the method of least-squares, this system of 
equations can be solved to determine the masses of each initial fissile nuclide present in 
the sample.  The one stipulation is that the delayed neutron intensity curves for each 
nuclide be unique, as shown in Figure 3.   
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Fig. 3.  Neutron decay curves for 235U and 239Pu 
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Chapter 4 
Numerical Analysis 
 
The mathematical formulation of the analysis is rooted in statistical theory that 
stipulates that given the correct set of circumstances, and observed parameter can be 
described by a set of definable parameters, or regressors.  In the case of this work, the 
observed parameter is the measured neutron detector response and the regressors are the 
masses of individual fissile nuclides.  The motivation for this chapter is to define the 
multivariate linear regression model chosen to describe the detector response, and 
provide justification as to the method used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
 
4.1 Method Overview 
The majority of the work performed for this project is the interpretation of the 
delayed neutron intensity profile of the irradiated samples.  The key to success of this 
work is to determine specific variances that occur in the neutron intensity spectra that can 
be associated with the presence of a unique fissile nuclide.   
The variations in the unique delayed neutron intensity profiles allow for the 
simultaneous determination of multiple fissile nuclides from a single delayed neutron 
counting spectrum.  To do so, the total neutron intensity profile must undergo 
deconvolution.  This, ultimately, is done by weighting expected neutron intensities for the 
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constituent fissile nuclides by their masses, the one caveat being that each fissile nuclide 
must have a unique neutron intensity-time profile.  
 The analysis begins with approximating the solution to the previously described 
system of equations using a least squares method.  This can be done because the linear 
combination of neutron intensity count rates represents an overdetermined system: it 
contains more equations than unknown parameters.   
 Because the total detector response can be taken as η observations made over a 
period of time so that c(t) is a linear combination of ω basis functions, where, again ω 
corresponds to the number of fissile nuclides present in the sample, as stipulated by 
Equation 7, the resultant count rate can be expressed in terms of the design matrix¸ D, as  
 
C=D.m;          (17) 
 
where, m is the unknown vector.  The design matrix will have the same number of 
columns as fissile constituents and the number of rows will be equal to the count-time of 
the system divided by the dwell time of the detector, which was previously defined asη.  
Defining the design matrix is a critical step in this analysis.  It describes the 
independent variables of the samples; that is, it defines the shape of the curve based on 
concentrations of fissile nuclides.  The number of independent variables varies, in that if 
the analysis is only considering delayed neutrons from a single fissile nuclide, there is 
only a single independent variable.  The goal of this work is, partially, to define a 
multivariable design matrix that will allow for the concurrent quantification of several 
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fissile components present in a sample.  In order to determine the design matrix, 
standards of single fissile nuclides were created in high concentration and irradiated.  
This yielded a count rate over a period of time, in this case five minutes, with minimal 
associated uncertainties.  The count rate was then expressed as a matrix, C, and imported 
into MATLAB software.  Because only a single fissile component was irradiated on a 
given standard, m was simply the scalar quantity equal to the mass of the fissile nuclide.  
Pi was then found simply by dividing the measured C matrix by the known mass, and the 
basis function for a single fissile component was found in terms of the neutron emission 
as a function of time and mass [n.s-1µg-1].  This process was independently repeated for 
each of the fissile constituents of analytical interest and finally, the design matrix D was 
defined as the linear combination of the individual basis functions for each fissile 
constituent.   
Once the design matrix was found, unknown samples could be analyzed.  These 
samples were irradiated and counted in an identical fashion.  The acquired raw spectrum 
is then treated as a [η x 1] matrix, defined at C above, where η is the number of time bins 
sampled and equal to the product of the frequency and the length of sampling time.  The 
system of fissile nuclide masses can be solved as 
 
 𝒎 = 𝑫!𝑫 !!𝑫′𝑪        (18)  
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Equation 18, however, does not have an exact solution, as D is not a square matrix and 
does not have an inverse.  To this end, the method of least squares was chosen to give an 
approximate solution for the mass, m, vector.   
 
 
4.2 Least Squares Analysis 
The measured delayed neutron emission spectrum of an irradiated sample was 
described by a multielement regression model.  The model defines the neutron spectrum 
by the contribution of several independent regressor variables.  To demonstrate the 
validity of this method, a model with two independent variables was formulated to 
describe the delayed neutron activation analysis spectrum of samples containing up to 
two fissile components.  The model has been defined by the relationship 
 𝑐 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" + 𝜀      (19) 
where the basis function PU describes the change in the neutron spectrum with respect to 
mU, the mass of 235U present in the sample; likewise, PPu measures the change in 𝑐 with 
respect of mPu. 
 As it happens, the above expression has no exact solution.  Therefore, the 
spectrum was interpreted using the method of ordinary least squares to determine the 
fissile masses mU and mPu.  The least squares method determines independent regressors 
by finding values that force the basis functions to best-fit experimental data.  This is done 
by choosing mU and mPu that minimize the sum of the squared differences between the 
measured neutron spectrum and the weighted basis functions at each time step 
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𝜀! = 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! + 𝑃!"!𝑚!" !!!!!      (20) 
where η is the number of data points in the array 𝑐.  The masses mU and mPu are 
determined by finding the critical masses that correspond to minimized sum of the 
squared errors. 𝜀!! = 𝐸 𝑚! ,𝑚!" = 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! − 𝑃!!"𝑚!" !   (21) 
To minimize E(mU,mPu), the partial derivatives with respect to the masses is set to zero 
and solved. 
!"!!! = 0 = !!!! 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! − 𝑃!!"𝑚!" !     (22) 
and 
!"!!!" = 0 = !!!!" 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! − 𝑃!!"𝑚!" !     (23) 
Evaluating the above expressions yields 
!"!!! = 0 = 2 ∙ (−𝑃!!) ∙ 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! − 𝑃!!"𝑚!"    (24) 
and 
!"!!!" = 0 = 2 ∙ (−𝑃!!") ∙ 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚! − 𝑃!!"𝑚!"       (25) 
The mU which satisfies the expression that the partial derivative with respect to mU  
equals zero can then be expressed in terms of the measured neutron spectrum and the 
basis function PU and PPu 
!"!!! = 0 = 𝑃!! ∙ 𝑐! −𝑚! 𝑃!! ! −𝑚!" 𝑃!! ∙ 𝑃!!"    (26) 
and 
!"!!!" = 0 = 𝑃!!" ∙ 𝑐! −𝑚! 𝑃!! ∙ 𝑃!!" −𝑚!" 𝑃!!" !  (27) 
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By simple algebraic manipulations, expressions for the masses can be found in terms of 
the measured neutron emission profile and basis functions. 
𝑚!" = !!! !∙ !!!"∙!! ! !!!∙!! ∙ !!!∙!!!"!!! !∙ !!!" !! !!!∙!!!" !      (28) 
𝑚! = !!!" !∙ !!!∙!! ! !!!"∙!! ∙ !!!∙!!!"!!! !∙ !!!" !! !!!∙!!!" !      (29) 
This equation can be generalized for the case where the analyzed sample may 
contain up to K fissile nuclides 𝑐! − 𝑃!!𝑚!!!!! !!!!!        (30) 
Provided that η>K, the regression model represents an overdetermined system of 
equations and has a unique solution. 
 There are a few alternative methods to using an ordinary least squares approach to 
solve for the nuclide masses.  To avoid a tedious and unnecessary discussion on why each 
of these more advanced methods were not employed, the Gauss-Markov Theorem will 
instead be used to demonstrate why the ordinary least squares method is the optimal 
choice for this spectral analysis. 
 The Gauss-Markov theorem stipulates that under a given set of assumptions, the 
least squares approximation 
 𝑚 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛! 𝜀!        (31) 
is the best unbiased linear estimator, where ε are the residual values between the 
experimental data and the basis functions weighted by their respective nuclide masses 
(67) (68).  This expression holds true, providing that (69) 
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1. The parameters, mi, are linear with respect to C 
2. The regressors, Pi, are not collinear 
3. 𝐸 𝜀!|𝑚!,… ,𝑚! = 0, for all i 
4. 𝑉 𝜀!|𝑚!,… ,𝑚! = 𝜎!, for all i 
5. 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀!|𝑚!,… ,𝑚! = 0 
The Gauss-Markov assumptions hold true for unbiased estimators, so it must first 
be demonstrated that the model chosen for this work is indeed unbiased.  A proof of 
unbiasedness is as follows.  Recall that the multielement regression model of the delayed 
neutron spectrum  𝑐 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" +⋯+ 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝜀    (32) 
can be simplified to 
 𝑐 = 𝐷 ∙𝑚 + 𝜀         (33) 
where 𝐷 is the design matrix defined in a previously and vector 𝑚 is an [1xN] array of 
nuclide masses.  To show unbiasedness, it must be demonstrated that the expected value 
of the nuclide mass array is equal to its true value.   
 𝐸 𝑚 = 𝐸 (𝐷!𝐷)!!𝐷𝑐        (34) 
 𝐸 𝑚 = 𝐸 𝐷!𝐷 !!𝐷(𝐷 ∙𝑚 + 𝜀)       (35) 
𝐸 𝑚 = 𝐸 𝐷!𝐷 !!𝐷𝐷𝑚 + 𝐷!𝐷 !!𝐷!𝜀)      (36) 
𝐸 𝑚 = 𝐸 𝑚 + 𝐸 𝐷!𝐷 !!𝐷!𝜀       (37) 
By definition of an unbiased model 
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𝐸 𝐷!𝐷 !!𝐷!𝜀 ≡ 0        (38) 
 
For this work, the model is unbiased if and only if there are no nonrandom 
contributing factors to the delayed neutron spectrum except for those which have been 
modeled by the basis functions. At this point, it can be said with certainty that the 
parameters PU and PPu sufficiently characterized all potential contributors to the spectra.  
However, as this work progresses and is applied to more complex samples, the above 
expression becomes increasingly more important; it must be certain that all possible 
fissile nuclides in the sample be accounted for, otherwise this method will fail. 
The first assumption stipulates that the parameters, mi, are linear with respect to 
the measured neutron counts.  This was experimentally demonstrated by a series of 
experiments, which quantified the relationship between the detector response and the 
mass of any nuclide present.  For this to be true, the change in detector response with 
respect to a given basis function must be proportional to the mass of the nuclide present.  
This is shown by taking the partial derivative of the measured delayed neutron spectrum 𝑐 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" +⋯+ 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝜀    (39) 
and then can be re-written in terms of the Nth nuclide 𝑐 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!𝑚!!!!!!! + 𝜀      (40) 
 
If  𝑚!!!!!!! = 0 
!!!!! = 0+ !!!!!!𝑚! + 0+ 0       (41) 
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!!!!! = 𝑚!         (42) 
To experimentally validate the assumption that the change in detector response is 
linear with respect to the mass of the nuclide present, a series of standards were analyzed.  
To confirm the linearity of the model, the relationship between the measured neutron 
spectrum and the basis function of any nuclide must be linear and equal to the mass of the 
nuclear present.  Figure 4 shows this relationship for 235U; Figure 5 shows this 
relationship for 239Pu. 
 
Fig. 4. Linearity of basis function for 235U 
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Fig. 5. Linearity of basis function for 239Pu 
 
The above relationships adequately fulfilled the linearity stipulation required for 
the Gauss-Markov expression to hold true.  It then must be shown that the basis functions 
are not collinear.  To show linear independence, it must be true that there is only a single, 
trivial solution to the expression 
 𝐴 ∙ 𝐷 = 0         (43) 
where  
D is the design matrix, a linear combination of all basis functions  
A is a vector of scalar multipliers which satisfies the expression.  This was indeed the 
case for basis functions PU and PPu.   
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 Next, it has to be shown that the expected value for the residual error is zero.  
This does not imply that the error is zero, simply that the error is random and independent 
with respect to the concentrations of fissile material.  Provided that there are no 
systematic errors and that the model adequately accounts for all fissile nuclides in the 
sample, this stipulation holds true.  To confirm this assumption, the model must meet two 
criteria: first, that there are no systematic errors, and second that the error did not increase 
proportionally with increasing sample mass.  To demonstrate that this assumption holds 
true, the relationship between nuclide mass and total sample residual was examined.  As 
can be seen in Figure 6 below, total residual values vary from sample to sample, but there 
is not an observable correlation between nuclide mass and residual errors.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Uncorrelated relationship between error and sample mass 
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 The nonlinear relationship between the magnitude of the error and the total mass 
of the fissile material in the sample ensures that Gauss-Markov provision on the expected 
value of the residual error holds true.  Likewise, the variance in the residual error must 
also be independent of sample mass 
 The fourth assumption stipulates that all errors have the same variance, which is 
to say that the model is homoscedastic.  Homoscedasticity ensures that the errors have the 
same uniform variance.  If the model is heteroscedastic, the ordinary least squares 
regression would not provide the best estimate for the nuclide masses.  Instead, an 
appropriately weighted sum of the squares would need to be utilized.  Individual values 
basis vector elements with greater associated errors would be given a smaller weight than 
basis vector elements with smaller associated errors.   
 To show that the model is homoscedastic, it must be proved that the associated 
error does not increase with an increasing independent variable.  The null hypothesis is 
that this holds true, it can be written so that 
 𝐻!:  𝑉 𝜀!|𝑚!,… ,𝑚! = 𝜎!       (44) 
Because it has been shown that the expected value of the error is zero, the above 
expression is equivalent to 𝐻!:  𝐸 𝜀!!|𝑚!,… ,𝑚! = 𝜎!       (45) 
Therefore, to test whether the model violates the null hypothesis, the data must show that 𝜀!! is not related to one or more of the independent variables.  This was surveyed by 
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regressing the squared residuals on the nuclide masses.  For a two nuclide-system, the 
secondary regression becomes 𝜀! = 𝛿! + 𝛿!𝑚! + 𝛿!𝑚! + 𝑣      (46) 
where v is the error term of the errors, which simply has a mean of zero for any nuclide 
mass.  If the independent variables are unrelated to the magnitude of the squared error, it 
will be shown that  
 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 0         (47) 
The next step, taken from the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscadasticity, is to find the 
Lagrange multiplier statistic (70) (71), which is simply proportional to squared residuals 
between the experimental data and the fitted basis functions 
 𝐿𝑀 = 𝑛𝑅!         (48) 
where n is simply the number of observations and LM is the Lagrange Multiplier statistic.  
If the null hypothesis holds true, the LM is asymptotically distributed as χ2.  To show the 
distribution of the Lagrange Multiplier statistic, a known standard was analyzed by a 
varying number of observations, n, and the residual errors were determined for each 
instance. In other words, an irradiated sample was analyzed multiple times by basis 
vectors of different sizes.  As the number of elements in the basis functions increased, the 
number of observations increased.  The null hypothesis was verified when the 
relationship between the number of observations and the magnitude of the residuals was 
found to generally follow a χ2 distribution.  This relationship is plotted below.  
 48 
 
Fig. 7. Relationship between uncertainty and number of observations 
 
The squared residual values of a sample analyzed by basis functions of increasing 
size showed that as the number of observables in the basis function increases, the 
magnitude of the residuals between the measured data and the weighted basis functions 
asymptotically goes to zero.  This suggests that the null hypothesis is true, as the results 
more or less approximated a χ2 distribution function.   
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 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀,𝑚! = 𝐸(𝜀𝑃! − 𝜀  𝐸 𝑃! ) 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀,𝑚! = 𝐸(𝜀𝑃!)− 𝐸(𝜀)  𝐸 𝑃!  
 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀,𝑚! = 𝐸(𝜀𝑃!) 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜀,𝑚! = 0 
This relationship holds true for models in which the number of observations is greater 
than the number of degrees of freedom in the sample.  That is to say, the covariance of 
the errors is zero if and only if the expected value of the errors is zero and there are more 
elements in the basis functions (more equations in the set) than there are potential fissile 
components.   
 
 
4.3 Overspecifying The Model 
As with any statistical model, overspecifying occurs when too many variables are 
used to describe a regression model.  A model can be overspecified in two regards, the 
first is the inclusion of irrelevant variables, which for this work would mean including 
basis functions for fissile nuclides that would not be present in the material analyzed.   
While it has been shown that the linear model will fail if biases due to unaccountable 
contributors to the spectra are present in the analyte, there are still undesirable 
consequences to including irrelevant basis functions in the model.  The inclusion of too 
many variables will ultimately effect the variances and consequently the confidence of 
the masses determined by ordinary least squares. 
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 The second way that a model can be overspecified is to overfit the model.  
Overfitting occurs when error is modeled into the basis functions.  This type of 
overspecifying is not as innocuous as the inclusion of too many variables.  This was 
avoided in the work by reducing statistical variances in the basis functions caused by 
detector noise and by excluding basis functions not corresponding to fissile nuclides.  
One can be tempted to include basis functions for sample background or even the effects 
of stochastic contributors to the delayed neutron spectrum, such as gamma-ray flux large 
enough to incur false count rates to the measured neutron spectrum. 
 The overfitting or overspecifying of any statistical model generally results in poor 
predictive performance, which in turn leads to poor nuclide estimates in the case of 
delayed neutron activation analysis.  As such, the formulated linear model should include 
only those basis functions that are neccessary. 
 
 
4.4 Formulation of Basis Functions 
 Basis functions numerically describe the delayed neutron emission profile for 
each fissile nuclide that has been irradiated under a prescribed set of conditions.  While it 
is possible to formulate basis function from the activation parameters, neutron detector 
efficiency, and known delayed neutron emission data, the technique described here 
utilizes an empirical method that determined basis functions using isotopically certified 
reference materials.  This was done for several reasons, but mostly because determining a 
basis function algorithmically introduces significantly more uncertainty.  Equation 44 in 
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fact could be used to describe the delayed neutron emission profile, but the reactor and 
detector parameters are not well characterized, and the delayed neutron emission data is, 
at best, an approximation.   𝑐 𝑡 = 𝜀 !!!!! 𝜎!𝜙(1− 𝑒!!!!!)!!!! 𝜈!!"!!!! 𝜆!"𝑒!!!"!!   (49) 
It was simply easier to produce basis functions, with much greater confidence, using 
standard reference materials. 
 The DNAA method outlined by this work was validated by analyzing samples 
that contained natural uranium, 239Pu, or some mixture thereof.  As such, the count rate 
was described by the expression 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" + 𝜀      (50) 
where 𝑃! and 𝑃!" are the basis functions for 235U and 239Pu, respectively.  By preparing 
a set of standards, which contained only a single fissile nuclide, equation 45 simplifies to 
either 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" + 𝜀       (51) 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝜀 
depending on which nuclide was omitted.  To determine the basis function for either 
nuclide, it becomes a matter of finding the neutron emission rate per unit mass  
[n.s-1.ng-1].  To solve for the basis function, the assumption was made that the error, ε, 
had an expected value of zero.   𝐸 𝜀 𝑃! ,𝑃!" = 0        (52) 
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This expression holds true if the functional relationship between the count rate and the 
basis functions accurately accounts for the relationship between fissile materials present 
in the sample and the measured neutrons.  In fact, the only reason that the expected value 
of the error would not be zero is if the model did not account for all fissile material 
present in the sample; residual analysis of the samples indicated no bias errors and 
demonstrated that the above relationship holds true.  Expressions for the basis functions 
of 235U and 239Pu can then be written 
𝑃!" = ! ! !!!!!"          (53) 𝑃! = ! ! !!!!!          (54) 
 
In order to mathematically describe the neutron detector response to the βn-decay 
of 235U, samples containing only uranium were carefully prepared using aliquots of a 
high-purity natural uranium in a 2% HNO3 solution with a concentration of 1,000 µg/mL 
on cotton swipes.  Each sample was pipetted and weighed.  The cotton swipe was 
inserted into an irradiation rabbit and allowed to dry in an oven at 85oC for several hours 
before sealing.  235U samples were made in triplicate and each contained 60 to 70 ng of 
fissile 235U.  The samples were irradiated for 90 seconds and pneumatically returned to 
the neutron detector array and counted for 90 seconds.  As is evident by the following 
figure, the basis function measurements were repeatable with a two Sigma uncertainty of 
approximately 3%.  While every effort was made to minimize this uncertainty, it was 
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none the less an unavoidable consequence of using empirically determined basis 
functions.  
 
Fig. 8. 235U basis function measurements 
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procedure outlined above to the preparation of uranium standards; again, efforts were 
made to ensure that samples were not contaminated with legacy fissile materials from the 
laboratory, which would falsify the determined basis function.  Under identical 
irradiation and counting parameters, the basis function describing the detector response to 
the βn-decay of irradiated 239Pu was found.  This again was repeated in triplicate; the 
results of which are plotted below. 
 
 
Fig. 9. 239Pu basis function measurements 
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 Finally, with the introduction of these sources of uncertainty, the model then 
becomes  
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + (𝑃! ± 𝜎!) ∙𝑚! + (𝑃!" ± 𝜎!) ∙𝑚!" + 𝜀   (55) 
 
 
4.5 Spectral Analysis 
The introduction of uncertainty to the individual basis functions poses a unique 
challenge to the analysis of the delayed neutron spectrum.  On one hand, this uncertainty 
can simply be propagated and taken into account when given the calculated nuclide 
masses.  However, this results in intolerably large uncertainties and errors in the final 
measurements.  It was therefore necessary to better understand the cause of these 
uncertainties in the basis functions. 
 The time-dependent delayed neutron emission spectrum of the irradiated 
standards can be expressed using the activation equation as 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝜀 !!!!! 𝜎!𝜙(1− 𝑒!!!!!)!!!! 𝜈!!"!!!! 𝜆!"𝑒!!!"(!!!!!)  (56) 
Nearly every parameter has some uncertainty with it; there is the uncertainty in the mass 
of the fissile material in the standard and arguably there is at least some variation in the 
thermal neutron flux.  But after careful scrutiny of the technique and the sample 
preparation methods, it was concluded that the only parameter that could possibly 
contribute a meaningful uncertainty to the basis function was the decay time of the 
sample. 
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Initially, the decay time was considered invariant from sample to sample and 
equal to the transfer time from the irradiation position to the detector array.  However, the 
current pneumatic transfer system is not capable of indicating the exact transfer time 
before the sample arrives at its counting position.  Intuitively, there are any number of 
reasons why one sample may return to the detectors a split second faster or slower than 
another.  If a reasonable uncertainty is introduced into the sample decay time, the 
spontaneous fluctuations in the basis functions are explained. 
Because sample decay time cannot be accurately measured, nor can it be 
predicted which samples will transfer quicker or slower than the standards, it must be 
assumed that the sample can arrive at any point within the bounds of 
 𝑡! = 𝜏! ± ∆𝑡         (57) 
where 𝜏! is the average decay time, which was found to be roughly 2.1 seconds.  Δt 
bounds the variability in transfer time.  The exponential relationship between the neutron 
spectrum and the decay time of a sample, a small deviation from the expected decay time, 
greatly changes the neutron emission profile.  Setting Δt to 0.1 seconds bounds the basis 
functions as 
 𝑃!"#$%! ∝ 𝑃!𝑒!!!"∙∆!!!!!        (58) 
 𝑃!""#$! ∝ 𝑃!𝑒!!"∙∆!!!!!        (59) 
Because no mechanism currently exists to accurately measure the sample transfer time 
and there is no way predict which samples will arrive quicker or slower than the 
 57 
standards, the assumption must be made that the transfer time can fall anywhere between 𝜏! ± ∆𝑡 with equal probability.   
 Consequently, when analyzing the measured delayed neutron spectrum, it must 
take into consideration that the best basis function can be any possible basis function that 
falls between the upper and lower bounds. 
 To determine the fissile nuclide masses of an irradiated sample, the delayed 
neutron spectrum was imported into MATLAB as an array of neutron counts in discrete 
time bins.  The ordinary least squares solution was found for the expression 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!!𝑚! + 𝑃!!"𝑚!" + 𝜀!      (60) 
The term 𝑃!! represents one of the basis functions that falls between the upper and lower 
bounds of the possible 235U basis functions.  Similarly, 𝑃!!" is one of the basis functions 
that falls between the upper and lower bounds of the 239Pu basis functions.  A script was 
written in MATLAB, which iteratively found the least squares solutions for the nuclide 
masses using basis functions that fall within the defined upper and lower bounds.  The 
script than iteratively determined which set of basis functions, 𝑃!! and 𝑃!!", correctly 
accounted for variance in the sample decay time, and consequently, which best predicted 
the fissile nuclide masses.  This was done by evaluating a “goodness of fit” criterion.   
 The “goodness of fit” parameter was optimized by determining the basis functions 
that minimized the squared-residuals between the total neutron count over the entire 
collection period (a scalar quantity, unlike the vector 𝐶  ) and the fitted values for 𝑚!!" 
and 𝑚!!.  The residuals of the simple regression model can be expressed as 
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 𝑢! = 𝑦 − (𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑚!! + 𝛽!"𝑚!!")      (61) 
where 
 𝑦 = 𝐶 𝑚!! and 𝑚!!" are the ordinary least squares solution to the expression 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!!𝑚! + 𝑃!!𝑚!" + 𝜀!       (62) 
for the ith basis functions, and 𝛽!, 𝛽!, and 𝛽!" are scalar coefficients describing the gross 
neutron counts over the entire counting period and the mass of each fissile nuclide. 
 The gross neutron counts over the entire counting period was chosen to evaluate 
calculated nuclide masses because of its much reduced sensitivity to small variances in 
the sample decay time.  The first-order sensitivity index is given by  
 𝑆! = !!!"#(!)         (63) 
Figure 10 shows the sensitivity that an uncertainty of 0.1 seconds has on the 235U basis 
function. 
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Fig. 10. Δt sensitivity as a function of counting time 
 
As the above figure illustrates, the small variations in decay time become less 
sensitive with time.  The sensitivity of a decay time variance of 0.1 seconds is only 
approximately 4% for the total neutrons emitted over a 90 second period. 
 The coefficients 𝛽!, 𝛽!, and 𝛽!" were empirically determined by evaluating the 
linear relationship between the total neutron detector response and increasing fissile 
nuclide mass.  This relationship was determined by preparing and irradiating two series 
of reference samples.  The first set of standards prepared contained only a variable 
concentration of 239Pu, mu=0.  This allowed for the change in the total neutron counts, 
with respect to the concentration of 239Pu, to be described.   
 𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!"𝑚!!" + 𝑢       (64) 
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The linear relationship between total detector response, measured in total neutrons 
counted over a 90 second period, and the increasing fissile nuclide mass is shown below 
in Figure 11.  The linearity of the detector response to increasing mass was an important 
factor when modeling this work with a regression function; had the detector response to 
increasing mass not been linear, then it would have meant one of two things.  The first 
possibility was that there were unaccounted for contributors to the measured spectrum, in 
which case the procedure for defining the basis functions would have to be re-evaluated.  
Or the second possibly would have been that there is a nonlinear detector response to an 
increasing neutron flux.  This latter possibility may come into consideration if some 
samples contain a large enough mass of fissile material, and detector dead-time and 
pileup effects cause the response to become nonlinear.  However, to this point, 
experimental data has shown a linear detector response for samples up to 1 microgram of 
fissile material.  This concentration exceeded the typical samples considered for this 
work; however, the detector response will have to be re-evaluated if this method is 
applied to samples containing more than 1 microgram of fissile material. 
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Fig. 11. Linear relationship between 239Pu mass and total neutron counts 
 
 The term 𝛽!" was found by determining the best fit linear approximation to the 
change in total neutrons detected to the change in 239Pu sample mass. 
 𝛽!" = ∆!∆!!"         (65) 
The second series of standards contained a fixed concentration of 239Pu (mPu = 49.15 ng) 
and a varying concentration of 235U (1.0 ng ≤ 235U ≤  50.0 ng).  The total neutrons 
detected over the 90 second period was expressed as 
 𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑚!! + 𝛽!"𝑚!!" + 𝑢      (66) 
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Fig. 12. Linear relationship between 235U and total neutron counts 
 
By determining coefficients 𝛽!, 𝛽!, and 𝛽!", a second metric was created to 
evaluate the validity of the masses determined by each of the basis functions.   
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Chapter 5 
System Characterization 
 
Having demonstrated that multiple fissile nuclides can be concurrently 
determined by measuring the time evolution of the delayed neutron spectrum of an 
irradiated sample, the method was then carefully scrutinized.  This was done for several 
reasons.  First, analyzing the method allowed for a more thorough understanding of the 
limitations of the technique and by considering these limitations, the applicability of the 
method could be inferred.  Second, by characterizing system specific parameters that 
effect this method, conclusions were then drawn as to which parameters could be further 
optimized or improved to better this NAA method.   
 Both system specific and sample specific characteristics were evaluated.  System 
specific characteristics are those that apply to the method at the High Flux Isotope 
Reactor and the Neutron Activation Analysis facility at Oak Ridge.  The parameters 
include the neutron flux profile at the irradiation position and specifics regarding the 
neutron detector array and its associated hardware.  Generalized parameters, such as the 
ideal activation and counting durations were optimized using delayed neutron emission 
and radioactive decay data, and would not be limited to the irradiations performed at 
HFIR.   Sample specific characteristics are those that apply to the types and quantities of 
materials best suited for this technique.   
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5.1 Delayed Neutron Counting System 
The Neutron Activation Analysis facility has employed delayed neutron 
activation analysis for several decades to quantify single fissile isotopes.  As such, an 
existing detector counting array was in place before the start of this project.  While some 
modifications were made, this project worked mostly within the confines of the existing 
system.   
The first modification addressed the fact that delayed neutron counting system 
initially in place at ORNL was not capable of providing the neutron count rate as a 
function of time at an adequate sampling frequency.  The system was also not capable of 
digitalizing that the signal so that the data could be interpreted and the neutron spectrum 
deconvolved. 
 The system initially utilized an analog ORTEC counter (The ORTEC 974A Quad 
Counter/Timer).  While this counter met the previous analytical needs of the system, 
which quantified single fissile isotopes, it was inadequate for this work.  This counter 
would only provide an integrated total counts over a preset time period; it would not, 
however, give the instantaneous delayed neutron count rate, which was required for this 
work.  To rectify this, the hardware was upgraded and a multichannel scaler (MCS) was 
chosen to replace the analog counter.  The ORTEC Easy MCS was chosen out of several 
commercially available units, due to its computer-interface that allowed for the raw data 
to easily be imported into MATLAB for signal analysis.  A MCS works by recording the 
number of events in successive time bins.  In the case of this work, an event was 
triggered by the 3He neutron detectors and the time bins were a variables that were 
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optimized; the greater the sampling frequency, the more susceptible the spectrum was to 
interferences caused by electronic noise or gamma-radiation.   Thus, the detector 
sampling frequency had to be optimized in order for the delayed neutron signal to be 
deconvoluted in a manner that the masses of the contributing fissile constituents could be 
determined.   
 One of the primary limiting constraints of this work is the sensitivity of the 
neutron detector system; in order to identify small variances in the time-dependent 
neutron intensity profile of multiple fissile nuclides, the efficiency of neutron detection 
must allow for such fidelity.  To that end, efforts were made in the preliminary stages of 
this work to identify optimal detector conditions. The pre-existing delayed neutron 
counting facility at HFIR utilized 18 gas-filled proportional detectors, arranged in three 
concentric circles about the irradiated sample.  While this configuration had been 
successfully employed for quite some time, this work provided an opportunity to perform 
a thorough characterization; it was possible to make adjustments to the system to increase 
detector efficiency. 
 The indirect detection of thermal neutrons makes use of one of several mitigating 
nuclear reactions to compensate for the neutral charge of the incident particles.  The 
neutron activation analysis laboratory at HFIR consists of an annular array of 3He-filled 
proportional neutron detectors.  Helium-3 proportional detectors create a measurable 
current by using the  𝐻𝑒! + 𝑛 →    𝐻! +    𝐻! + 765  𝑘𝑒𝑉      (67) 
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reaction to ionize a carrier gas.  The (n,p) reaction has a 1/ 𝐸 dependence for low-energy 
neutrons.  Therefore, adequate neutron moderation is necessary to increase the signal 
output of the detector system.  Alternative to 3He gas-filled proportional detectors, boron 
trifluoride had previously been used in the system.  However, BF3 gas has an increased 
sensitivity to gamma-rays compared to 3He.  While high energy photons would not 
inherently be expected in the activation products of interest to this work, the background 
noise had to be minimized and as such, 3He proved to be the optimal detector material. 
 There is strong correlation between neutron energy and the (n,p) reaction of 3He.  
Consequently, the key to optimizing the detector system lies in determining how to 
maximize the thermal neutron flux incident on the detector, while minimizing the total 
neutron attenuation through the moderator.  The optimization was a two-fold approach, 
determining the ideal position of the detectors and the best neutron moderating material. 
To determine the most effective arrangement and position of the gas tubes, Monte 
Carlo simulations were performed using MCNPX.  A simple input deck was comprised 
of an isotropic neutron source that emitted neutrons with energies consistent with 
averaged delayed neutron groups.  Surface tallies (F2 tallies) were utilized in concentric 
cylinders about the source.  The neutron flux, ϕ, profile as a function of radial distance 
from the source, r, and energy, e, was obtained.  The two parameters of most interest 
were the thermal neutron flux, ϕt, and the unattenuated neutron flux, ϕo.  The thermal 
neutron flux was calculated as 
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 𝜙! 𝑟 = 𝜙 𝐸, 𝑟 𝑑𝐸!.!"#$  !"!       (68) 
 
where 
ϕ(E,r) is the total neutron flux as a function of energy and distance from the source 
r is the radial distance from the isotropic neutron emitting source 
E is the neutron energy 
 
Also, the attenuated neutron flux was given as 
 
 ϕ(𝑟) = 𝑒!! !∙!∙! ∙ 𝜙 𝐸, 𝑟 𝑑𝐸!!       (69) 
 
where 
µ is the linear attenuation coefficient of neutrons through the moderator, integrated over 
all delayed neutron energies 
ρ is the moderator density 
 By determining thermal-, and total-, neutron fluxes as a function of radial distance 
from the source, the detector system was then be optimized to achieve greatest thermal 
neutron flux, while minimizing attenuation.  These calculations were necessary to 
maximize the (n,p) reaction rate in the proportional detectors, as 3He has a (n,p) cross 
section of 5328 b at 0.0253 eV.  Because delayed neutrons are emitted at energies higher 
than 0.0253 eV, a moderating material is necessary for optimal detection.  Several 
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different moderating materials were considered, including light water, heavy water, and 
polyethylene.   
   
 
5.2 Detector Sampling Frequency 
As far as experimental procedures, there were very few parameters that could 
have been changed.  Of course, times of irradiation, decay, and counting were considered, 
but other than those terms, the NAA procedures allowed for few optimization parameters.  
The experimental setup, too, was almost entirely unmodifiable, with the one major 
exception being the detector sampling frequency.  The regression model chosen to 
described the measured neutron spectrum of an irradiated sample collects total neutron 
emissions over a finite time period.  The width of this time bin had significant 
implications on the resolution capabilities of this method, as the magnitude of the time 
bins greatly affects the measured signal-to-noise ratio of the total collected spectrum.  
Assuming that the parametric quantities are sound, the primary contributing factors to the 
error, ε, can be defined as the detector noise.  Random errors arise from a number of 
sources, but this noise can primarily be attributed to high frequency electromagnetic 
variances in the detector components. 
 An idealized expression for the total detector response over a finite time bin can 
be assumed to have only two components.  The first component is simply the signal, 
which will be defined here as the contribution to the measured spectrum that can be 
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attributed to the decay of delayed neutron precursors.  Using this definition of the term 
“signal”, the noise would simply be equal to the error, as it has been defined previously. 
Recall that the expression describing the detector response is not a continuous 
function but rather a system of linear equations of the form 
 𝑐! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑡! ± 𝛿 ∙𝑚! +!!!! 𝜀      (70) 
The number of equations in the system, η, is equal to  
 𝜂 = !!          (71) 
where T is the total count time and δ is the detector sampling frequency.   
As the collection time bin increases, both the single and noise contributors to the 
detector response increase, though not at the same rate.  Because noise signals at different 
times are independent events, and therefore uncorrelated, the total noise over a period of 𝑡! ± 𝛿 2 is given as the cross-correlations of independent events and is found as the sum 
of the squared noise signals, such that  
 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝜀!!!!! !!!!! ! ⇒ 𝛿𝜀! = 𝛿 𝜀!     (72) 
The signal, however, is simply the total signal integrated over the entire time period 
 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑃!𝑚!!!!! !!!!! ! ⇒ 𝛿 ∙ 𝑃!𝑚!     (73) 
Consequently, the relationship between the signal-to-noise ratio and the size of the time 
bins is proportional to the root of the size of the time bin.  This relationship stems from 
 !"#$%&!"#$% = !∙ !!!!! !! ∝ !! = 𝛿       (74) 
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As the bin sizes increase, the measured signal fluctuations caused by detector noise 
decreases in relationship to the total acquired signal.   
 In order to increase the sensitivity of this technique, the single-to-noise ratio 
needed to be optimized.  The first step was to configure detector components to reduce 
sensitively to background radiation and false contributors to the neutron spectrum.  This 
was nominally accomplished by operating at a slightly high basis voltage; in all instances 
to date, collecting enough raw counts from an irradiated sample was not an issue. 
 The next step then was to optimize a detector sampling frequency that increased 
the signal-to-noise ratio by decreasing extraneous noise in the spectrum.  In essence, 
because counts are taken at discrete time intervals, this became an exercise in signal 
summing.  The relationship between the measured signal-to-noise ratio with regards to 
the size of the sampling time bins was measured by measuring the neutron emission of a 
sealed 241Am(Be) test source.  Spectra were acquired for 90 seconds varying the detector 
sampling frequency from 20 Hz to 0.1 Hz.   
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Fig. 13. Signal-to-noise sensitivity to detector bin size 
 
As is evident by Figure 13, above, the measured signal-to-noise ratio generally follows 
the predicted 𝛿 relationship (shown as a dashed line in the above figure). 
 
 
5.3 Neutron Flux Characterization 
The other system-specific characteristic of the irradiation is the thermal and fast 
neutron flux profiles at the irradiation position adjacent to the HFIR core.  Based on 
copious historical measurements, it was expected that there is a significant evolution of 
the thermal neutron flux over the course of the reactor fuel core lifecycle, which is 
typically only about 26 days before shutdown and refueling is required.  Consequently, 
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the changing neutron profile translates to variable activation parameters and the need to 
reformulate basis functions with the changing irradiation dynamics. 
 Neutron flux measurements were needed to show that despite the evolving flux 
profile over the course of several weeks, the thermal and fast neutron fluxes remain 
principally static over short-time periods, on the order of hours so that irradiation and 
sample measurements can be made in “batches” without continually having to normalize 
irradiation parameters based on variability of the activating neutron flux.  Ideally, if a 
flux could be considered invariant over a few hours, the basis function would not have to 
be continually re-evaluated and once they were determined, the functions could be used 
for a large set of samples.  Practically, this translates to more samples processed and 
analyzed per hour. 
 In order to demonstrate that the neutron flux profile remains unchanged over the 
course of an operating day, the fast and thermal neutron fluxes were calculated at several 
times throughout the day, in intervals of every few hours.  High purity Au and Mn foils 
were irradiated and their respective activities were measured using a HPGe detector.  The 
fast neutron flux was determined using the activation of the 197Au(n,γ)198Au  because of 
its large resonance absorption cross section of 197Au(n,γ)198Au at ~4.91 eV.  The 
activation of the Mn foil, 55Mn(n,γ)56Mn, is dominated by the thermal absoption cross-
section.  The difference in fast and thermal absorption cross sections for each material 
allowed for the difference in activation product activities to be used to concurrently 
determine the thermal neutron flux and the fast neutron flux.  The thermal:fast ratio could 
then be inferred from the activation rate of Au to that of Mn (72).  Almost as important to 
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the irradiation parameters as the thermal flux is the assurance that the fast neutron flux 
remains negligible by comparison so that the fast fissioning of 238U does not contribute to 
the delayed neutron spectrum during sample analysis, nor do interferences arise due to 
the 17O(n,p)à17N + β-1à17*Oà16O+n, which occurs primarily at high incident neutron 
energies. 
 To determine these parameters, expressions for the thermal and fast neutron 
fluxes were derived from the activation equation 
 𝐴 = 𝜎!𝜙!𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐶𝜃𝑃!𝜉        (75) 
where  
A is the activity  at a given energy σT is the total activation cross section, over all energies ϕT is the total neutron flux, over all energies 
N is the number of target atoms 
S is the saturation factor, (1-exp(-λti)), where ti is the irradiation time 
D is the decay factor, exp(-λtd),  where  td  is  the  decay  time  C  is  the  counting  factor,  (1-­‐expt(-­‐λtc)),  where  tc  is  the  counting  time  Pγ  is  the  emission  probability  of  a  photon  of  a  particular  energy  ξ  is  the  detector  efficiency  at  a  particular  photon  energy  
 
These total measured activities of 198Au and 56Mn following activation were then 
used to calculate neutron fluxes.  The difference between the total activity of 56Mn and 
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the activity due to the absorption of fast neutrons was used to derive an expression for the 
thermal flux  
 𝜙!! = !!"!!"∙!!"!! ∙ !!!!!!"!! − !!"!!!"!! ∙ 𝜙!     (76) 
  
The fast neutron flux was determined from the fast activation of the Au foil; the activity 
of the Mn foil was needed to correct for the contributions of the thermal activation of Au 
in the measured activity 
 𝜙! = !!"!!"∙ !!!!!!"!! !!!"!! ∙ !!"!!"∙!!"!! ∙ !!!!!!"!!!!!"!!!"!! ∙!!"!! !!!"!      (77) 
 
 The above expressions were used to find the activation parameters over the course 
of 1 day.  Samples were irradiated for 20 seconds and after a variable decay time of a few 
hours based on maintaining detector dead times <5% (appropriate decay times were 
corrected for each sample), were counted until appropriate counting statistics were 
achieved, which took on the order of 15 minutes. It was shown that over the course of an 
8 hour operating day, both the thermal and fast neutron fluxes remained unchanged.   
 
 
5.4 Activation Parameters 
Activation parameters were optimized to achieve the greatest detection sensitivity 
possible.  The first parameter considered was the irradiation time.  Efforts were made to 
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keep the total time of analysis as low as possible, so that this protocol could be an 
effective method of quickly analyzing samples.  The general expression for the neutron 
activation saturation model, 𝑆 = 1− 𝑒!!!!           (78) 
where S governs the maximum activity immediately following neutron irradiation, 
 λ is the decay constant of the activation product,  
ti is the time of irradiation.  
 As ti→∞, S approaches 1, total saturation, asymptotically.  Practical constraints 
are placed on the maximum time of irradiation based on the half-life of the activation 
product.   
 Adequate activation saturation, for the purposes of this work, occurred when the 
saturation factor reached approximately 0.99.  Using the above equation and an effective 
decay constant given by the average averaged decay constants of all delayed neutron 
precursor nuclides 
 𝜆 = !!!!!!!          (79) 
which was determined using the six-group delayed neutron group data and calculated for 
both 235U and 239Pu.  Using the effective decay constant, an expression for the optimal 
irradiation time was found 
 𝑡! = !!"  (!!!)!          (80) 
 76 
Figures 14 and 15, below, illustrates that an irradiation time of 90 seconds achieves the 
desired saturation for both 235U and 239Pu and irradiating for longer periods has an 
inconsequential increase to the activation saturation.   
 
Fig. 14. Saturation as a function of irradiation time for 235U 
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Fig. 15. Saturation as a function of irradiation time for 239Pu 
  
An irradiation time of only 90 seconds was advantageous from a practical 
standpoint, as it kept the total time of analysis for each sample to a minimum.  Early 
experiments during this project utilized a 180 second irradiation time, giving an effective 
saturation factor of 0.9998, but this had no observable advantage to the final 
measurements and only reduced the number of samples that were able to be processed in 
an hour.  For this DNAA method to be practically implemented, the total time of analysis 
must be kept to a minimum.  A 90 second irradiation time was found to be optimal.   
 If this DNAA method were to be applied at a facility other than HFIR, the 
irradiation time and other parameters, such as acquisition time optimized here, would be 
suitable for other neutron sources. 
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5.5 Acquisition Time 
Just as the sample irradiation time was an important parameter optimized, an ideal 
acquisition, or count time, needed to be found.  Because of the negatively exponential 
relationship between the delayed neutron intensity of an irradiated fissile sample and the 
length of time after irradiation, there reaches a time when the basis functions of 
individual nuclides converge to zero.  An acquisition time of 90 seconds was chosen for 
multiple reasons.  A practical constraint placed on this method is that it must be capable 
of analyzing several samples per hour, so a premium was placed on maintaining short 
collection times.  The primary reason for a 90 second count time, however, was that after 
90 seconds, the intensity of the delayed neutron emission rate for either 235U or 239Pu is 
less than 5% of its initial emission rate.  Considering again the importance of the signal-
to-noise ratio, because the variance in the detector noise is independent of the signal, the 
noise in the system remains constant throughout the spectrum collection. Consequently, 
at lower neutron emission rates, the signal becomes increasingly sensitive to the effects of 
background counts and detector noise.  At 90 seconds, an adequate spectrum is recorded 
and the tail end of the delayed neutron signal is still great enough to not be detrimentally 
affected by sporadic fluctuations in the measured neutron intensity.  
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5.6 Lower Limits of Detection 
 One of the most important metrics when evaluating any analytical technique is the 
lower limits of detection.  Practically, these lower boundaries of detectability govern the 
technique’s applicability to many aspects of nuclear forensic efforts.  Offered here is a 
derivation of the theoretical detection limits for any fissile material, as well as observed 
detection limits for 235U and 239Pu in mixed uranium-plutonium matrices.  A discussion as 
to the differences between the expected and determined detection limits is given as well. 
 
Theoretical Detection Limits 
 The classic 1968 paper by Lloyd Currie serves, to this day, as the standard for 
quantifying detection capabilities of radiochemical analytical methods (73). Currie 
defined three limiting values: the critical level, LC, at which point qualitative assertions 
can be made as to whether or not a signal is detected; the detection limit, LD, or the 
minimal concentration needed for quantitative measurements; and the determination 
limit, LQ, at which point measurements can be made with a given uncertainty (74).  These 
levels, according to Currie, are expressed as the standard deviation of the background 
signal, weighted by abscissas of a normal distribution.  Expressions for critical levels, 
detection levels, and determination limits, as a function of counts are given below. 
 𝐿! = 1.64 𝜇! 
         (81) 
 𝐿! = 2.71+ 3.59 𝜇!       (82) 
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 𝐿! = 50 1+ 1+ !!!" !/!        (83)  
Currie defines µB as the sum of the limiting mean of the sample blank and the limiting 
mean of increased background due to interferences.  Using the three expressions above, 
expressions for the critical level and detection limits were derived for this DNAA 
technique. 
 In the domain of the detector response, or count domain C, 𝜇! is classically 
defined as the limiting mean of the blank system response.  This definition is a bit of a 
misnomer in the case of DNAA and should instead be defined as the difference between 
the gross signal, 𝜇!!!, and the net signal, 𝜇!.  The gross signal is equal to the measured 
neutron emission, defined previously by the vector 𝐶. 
 𝐶 = 𝜇!!!         (84) 
 The net signal is then best realized as the signal which can be accounted for by the 
design matrix, weighted by the masses of the fissile components present in the sample. 
 𝜇! = 𝑃!𝑚!!!!!         (85) 
 Finally, 𝜇! is then equal to the signal not accounted for by the design matrix.  
Recalling that the gross signal can be expressed by the multiple regression model, 
 𝜇!!! = 𝐶 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝜀!!!!       (86) 
Then 𝜇! can be expressed by the sum of the sample blank plus the error 
 𝜇! = 𝑃! + 𝜀         (87) 
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𝜇!, which is perhaps most intuitively realized as the signal unaccounted for, can be 
calculated as the magnitude of the difference between the total detector response and the 
signal attributed by the fissile material in the sample, 
 𝜇! = 𝐶 − 𝛽!𝑚!!!!!        (88) 
By the transitive property, this value of 𝜇! directly corresponds to what is often simply 
referred to as the “mean background signal” and can therefore be used to find the critical, 
detection, and determination limits using equations 81, 82, and 83, respectively.  These 
expressions can be redefined as  
 𝐿! = 1.64 𝐶 − 𝛽!𝑚!!!!!        (89)  
 𝐿! = 2.71+ 3.59 𝐶 − 𝛽!𝑚!!!!!       (90) 
𝐿! = 50 1+ 1+ !! !!!!!!!!!" !/!       (91) 
 In order to get meaningful detection limit values, 𝐿! , 𝐿!,and   𝐿!, need to be 
transformed into the mass domain by letting by 𝑓: Càm by 𝑓 𝜇 =: !!!, where 𝛽! is the 
basis function of any fissile nuclide, i.   
 Finally, expressions for the lower limits of detection in the domain m can be 
expressed 
𝐿! = !.!" !! !!!!!!!!!!         (94) 
𝐿! = !.!"!!.!" !! !!!!!!!!!!        (95) 
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𝐿! = !" !! !! !! !!!!!!!!!" !/!!!        (96) 
 
An interesting, although not unexpected, consequence that emerges from the 
above expression is that as the number of basis functions increases, lower bounds of 
detection also increase.  This is due to the introduction of uncertainty and increasing 
residual values in each basis function.  This becomes meaningful as this method is 
applied to even more complex materials, which could potentially include three or more 
fissile nuclides. 
 
Measured Detection Limits 
 Detection limits for 235U and 239Pu in a binary mixture of 239Pu and 235U were 
determined using the expressions derived previously.  19 mixed samples were irradiated, 
counted, and critical, detection, and determination limits were calculated for each sample.  
The results of which are plotted in Figs. 16 and 17 for 239Pu and 235U, respectively.   
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Figure 16. Detection, Critical, and Determination Limits of 239Pu 
 
Figure 16 shows the lower limits of detection and quantification for 239Pu in 
samples containing a binary mixture of natural uranium and fissile plutonium.  The limits 
were calculated using the total residual values of a set of analyzed reference standards.   
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Fig. 17. Detection, Critical, and Determination Limits of 235U 
 
Determination limits were consistently on the order of 1-2 nanograms of 235U and 
twice that for 239Pu.  These values are several orders of magnitude greater than detection 
limits typically offered by advanced mass spectrometry techniques.  The difference 
between the limits for 235U and 239Pu correspond with the number of delayed neutrons 
emitted per nuclide; 235U emits, on average, about 2.5 times as many delayed neutrons 
per fission event than 239Pu.  Because fewer neutrons are emitted per nanogram of 
material present, a greater concentration of 239Pu than 235U is needed to achieve minimum 
detection limits. 
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Chapter 6 
Error and Uncertainty 
 
Once a method was determined, the most important metric evaluated was the 
uncertainty of the associated with the determined results.  A thorough understanding of 
the major contributors to the uncertainty of the measurements was vital to the analytical 
technique.  However, an important distinction must be made between errors and 
measurements uncertainties.  As will be discussed in greater detail, errors arise in the 
form of unaccountable contributors to the measured spectrum.  The uncertainty in 
measurements stems from a variety of factors, but as will be shown, the uncertainty of the 
determined nuclide masses is dominated by only a few parameters. 
 
 
6.1 Errors 
 Recall that a multi-element regression model is used to describe the measured 
delayed neutron emission spectrum of the form 
 𝑐 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑃!𝑚! + 𝑃!"𝑚!" + 𝜀      (95) 
The errors, 𝜀, arise from the counts that cannot be described as part of the background, 𝑃!, or the parameters described by either the uranium or plutonium basis functions.  In 
order to minimize the background, detector parameters were optimized; in order to 
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minimize the error such that the expected value of 𝜀 was zero, all contributors and 
potential contributors to the spectrum were defined by a well categorized design matrix. 
 Adequately defining the background spectrum and minimizing it is one of the 
single most important ways to minimize the error.  Another way to minimize the error is 
to optimize detector parameters and adequately define the basis functions.  To optimize 
the detector system parameters, in an effort to minimize background signals to the 
spectrum, it was necessary to be mindful of the causes of an increased neutron 
background spectrum.  The minor contributors to the signal can be secondary neutron 
radiation from cosmic ion radiation interactions or even terrestrial natural neutron 
irradiation (75) and are accounted for by the term 𝑃!.  Detector response due to an 
induced γ-flux must also be taken into consideration.   
There are several ways to account for the effects of γ radiation on the detector 
array.  The first is to describe the effects of the short and long-lived radionuclides that 
could potentially be present.  Practically speaking, this was avoided for two reasons.  
First, the design matrix would have become overly complicated if basis functions were 
defined for the detector response to high and low energy, short and long-lived γ emitting 
nuclides.  The second motivation for not characterizing the spectrum in this way was that 
findings have consistently shown that using BF3 neutron detectors, as were used for this 
work, have a negligible response to γ radiation (76) (77) and therefore the 
characterization is not needed.  The detectors were optimized not to maximize the 
neutron signal, but to minimize noise; high detector bias voltages were primarily 
responsible for minimizing any detector response to an induced γ field. 
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 Once  𝑃! is minimized, 𝜀 can be evaluated.  The condition that must be met is that 
 E 𝜀!|𝑚! ,𝑚!" = 0        (96) 
Conceptually, this stipulation says that the error must be due to random fluctuations and 
not due to an unaccounted contributing factor to the measured delayed neutron spectrum.  
By minimizing the background counts, many would-be contributors (such as natural 
background radiation) are not recorded by the detector array and are therefore not a 
significant source of error.   
If nonrandom or systematic contributors to the delayed neutron spectrum were 
present but otherwise unaccounted for, they would be qualitatively observed in the 
residual spectrum.  The residual spectrum is simply the difference between the measured 
spectrum and the neutrons accounted for by the weighted basis functions.  This is given 
by the expression:  𝑅 = 𝐷 ∙𝑚 − 𝐶        (97) 
By evaluating the residuals for spectra containing 239Pu, 235U or a mixture of the 
two materials, it was confirmed that the design matrix was adequate and that the errors 
were random and minimal.  However, there were still errors, and these errors were taken 
into consideration when calculating the uncertainty of the determined nuclide masses. 
What will hereafter be referred to as the spectral fit-factor is a quantity that 
describes the difference between the measured neutron emission profile and the design 
matrix, weighted by the calculated nuclide masses.  The fit-factor serves as a numerical 
representation of the error that arises from fitting explanatory functions to a measured 
neutron emission profile.   
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The fit-factor parameter is an expression of the total measured neutrons which 
were not accounted for by the basis functions.  The error due to the fit-factor for the Nth 
fissile nuclide is expressed as 𝜎!!! = !!! !!!!!!!         (98) 
The fit factor expression was used to determine the mass uncertainty for each nuclide due 
to poor fitting statistics.   
 By definition, errors are quantified differences between the value of a 
measurement and an individual result (78).  These errors between the predicted spectrum 
and the measured spectrum are transcribed into a measurement uncertainty by the above 
equation, which weights the difference in counts by the scalar coefficients describing the 
gross neutron counts over the entire counting period and the mass of each fissile nuclide. 
 
 
6.2 Uncertainty 
 Uncertainties, fundamentally different from errors, arise from measurements 
made and represent a dispersion of possible values the quantified value might reasonably 
take.  It is important that all uncertainties that contribute to the final uncertainty of the 
determined nuclide masses are well understood; while uncertainties certainly cannot be 
eliminated from any analytical method, their reduction and minimization greatly enhance 
the precision of the method. The uncertainties that contribute to the range of possible 
values that the final nuclide masses may take stem from numerous sources, all of which 
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can be classified as belonging to either uncertainties from the preparation of the standards 
set or uncertainties in the irradiation parameters.   
 The preparation of the standards set, which was needed in order to empirically 
model the fissile nuclide basis functions, introduced much of the dominating total 
uncertainty.  The major contributors to this uncertainty are caused by instrumentation and 
reagent purity.  Minor contributors, such as those caused by measurement conditions (the 
temperature of the room during sample preparation), sample blanks and background, and 
operator effects were considered, though not propagated to the total measurement 
uncertainty of the nuclide masses.  These minor contributors were accounted for and 
corrected ad hoc, by accounting for small variations of reference material density due to 
temperature differences, making repeated measurements of sample blanks to ensure that 
natural fissile material in the cotton was below detectable limits, and by two-person 
verification of irradiation processes to ensure operator effects had negligible bearing on 
measurements. Beginning with the reference materials themselves, the certified elemental 
composition of the standards as well as their isotopic composition both limited the 
precision of the final analysis.  These uncertainty terms will be defined as 
 𝜎! and 𝜎! 
where the subscripts E and I represent the uncertainties due to the elemental 
concentration of the reference standard and the uncertainty of its isotopic composition, 
respectively.  In preparation of the standards, where cotton swipes were spiked with 
concentrations of fissile reference material, uncertainty was introduced by way of 
measurement uncertainty of the balance.  The materials themselves were aqueous, and 
 90 
were pipetted onto the cotton substrates, but the sample masses were also measured, as 
well as volumes, for more precise measurements.  The uncertainty of the balance used at 
the Neutron Activation Analysis Lab in preparation of the standards is defined by the 
term 
 𝜎! 
 The remaining sources of uncertainty come from uncertainties in the activation, 
decay, and counting of the standards and unknown samples.  The neutron activation of 
the sample introduces many sources of uncertainty, though the total uncertainty of the 
measurements is dominated by only a few.   
 The irradiation of the samples themselves introduced many minor contributors of 
uncertainty.  The one parameter that was shown to evolve over the lifecycle of the reactor 
core is the thermal neutron flux.  Small permutations in thermal neutron flux alter the 
activation parameters from sample to sample.  After conducting flux measurements at 
various times during the reactor core cycle, it was found that on time frames that are short 
compared to the life cycle of the core, these flux variations do not add a measurable 
uncertainty to the nuclide measurements.  A characterization of the flux is offered in 
Chapter 5; however, there is only a negligible change in the neutron flux over a period of 
a few hours.  As long as samples are irradiated and counted in “batches”, this stipulation 
holds true.  However, basis functions will have to be reconfigured if measurements are 
repeated at a later time in the reactor lifecycle.  Other uncertainties that arise during the 
irradiation period of the sample analysis have negligible effects on the total measurement 
uncertainty.  Measurement uncertainties associated with other terms of the activation 
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equation, such as uncertainties in the fission cross sections and decay constants are well 
below the analytical capabilities of this method and were therefore omitted from the final 
propagated measurement uncertainty. 
 As has already been discussed, the uncertainties that arise due to fluctuations in 
the sample decay time have been addressed as a separate issue.  A decay time uncertainty 
of Δt = 0.1 seconds was assumed in the numerical evaluation of the delayed neutron 
spectrum and masses were iteratively solved using a direct enumeration method.  The 
numerical evaluation solved for the nuclide masses using basis functions that fell within 
the upper and lower bounds of the range of basis functions by solving for discrete basis 
functions at decay time variation of  <0.005 seconds.  Consequently, an effective decay 
time uncertainty of this magnitude is of negligible consequence to the total measurement 
uncertainty and was omitted from propagation. 
 Uncertainties, which arise due to counting parameters, were considered and 
individually evaluated.  Geometric effects on the total counting efficiency were briefly 
considered during the initial stages of this investigation.  However, due to the physical 
constraints of the irradiation vessel and the arrival position in the neutron detector array, 
there was only a small variability of sample geometry.  Further, a literature search 
confirmed the experimental observations that geometric effects account for only a small 
fraction of the total combined uncertainty. A 2008 paper by Greenberg at the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology suggested an uncertainty of < 0.01% for geometric 
counting effects, for small samples of similar shape.  Further, the same paper also 
confirms the observations that small variations of sample placement within the irradiation 
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rabbit have a negligible effect on the neutron fluence exposure (79).  This holds true for 
samples of the same size; if this method were to be applied to other samples, this 
parameter will need to be revisited, but for the purposes of irradiating and counting 
cotton swipe materials, small variations in sample geometry did not cause an observable 
variation in the delayed neutron emission spectrum.   
 To quantify the measurement uncertainty of the calculated masses, the combined 
standard uncertainty is found by the square root of the sum of the squared uncertainty 
components 
𝑢 = 𝜎!!         (99) 
The expanded uncertainty, which weights the standard uncertainty by a coverage factor 
chosen by a desired confidence level, is given by 
𝑈 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝜎!!        (100) 
Uncertainties presented for this work were determined by finding the standard 
uncertainty of the major contributing factors to the total measurement uncertainty at a 
confidence interval of 95%.  These uncertainties were found by the expression 
𝑈 = 2 ∙ 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! + 𝜎!!!       (101) 
The above expression defines the interval about the resultant nuclide mass  𝑚! − 𝑈!" ≤ 𝑀! ≤ 𝑚! + 𝑈!"       (102) 
Where mi is the resultant mass found by the analytical method and Mi is the true value of 
the mass of the ith nuclide present in the sample. 
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6.3 Conclusions 
 The range and type of applications this application of delayed neutron activation 
analysis has is ultimately dictated by these final uncertainties.  The sensitivity of mass 
measurements is one of the primary factors when evaluating this technique and choosing 
it above other, more sensitive, destructive analytical methods.   
 The dominating contributors to the total uncertainty of the nuclide measurements 
are those associated with fitting errors and the preparation of the standards.  It is feasible 
to lower the magnitude of each of these parameters, especially the later, with different, 
more resolute reference materials.  The more precise the standards used to characterize 
the delayed neutron emission profiles for each nuclide, the better the analytical capability 
of this method will be as a whole.  However, under the constraints of this project and the 
materials at hand, these uncertainties were at a minimum. 
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Chapter 7 
Validation Experiment 
 
To test and validate this delayed neutron activation analysis technique, a final 
experiment was conducted.  A series of seventeen samples were prepared on cotton 
swipes and measured.  The purpose of this experiment was threefold: to substantiate the 
claim that this method is capable of accurately determining uranium in the presence of 
plutonium, which is often experimentally challenging using even the most advanced mass 
spectrometric techniques.  Similarly, this experiment sought to confirm that plutonium 
measurements could be made in mixed samples without chemical separation.  Finally, the 
experiments were performed to validate this method and confirm the hypothesized 
capability of nondestructively concurrently determining multiple fissile nuclides. 
The analytical procedure can easily be discretized into two major tasks.  The first 
was the irradiation of samples made in-house to experimentally validate the mathematical 
formulation described previously.  The second task was the data analysis and the creation 
of an analytical protocol for the simultaneous quantification of multiple fissile 
constituents using a single delayed neutron intensity profile. 
 While delayed neutron counting has been utilized as a method of quantifying 
fissile material at HFIR for many years, this work does so in a much different fashion 
(80) (81), and as such, multiple nuclides can be quantified concurrently.  Up to this point, 
the counting system at HFIR has primarily been utilized for single-isotope quantification 
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by comparative method, where the integrated count rate over a prescribed period of time 
is determined for a known standard and an unknown sample.  The ratio of the total counts 
is equal to the ratio of the masses (82).  This method has been used exhaustively by 
numerous facilities for similar analysis; however, the presence of multiple fissile 
components cannot be identified using this method.  Further, if a sample were to contain 
multiple fissile components, the results of such analysis would be erroneous.   
 
7.1 Procedure 
 Samples were prepared parallel to the procedure outlined for the preparation of 
the standards used to characterize the system.  Isotopically certificated reference 
materials were pipetted and massed to ensure accuracy of the samples onto cotton 
substrates similar to the TexWipe materials used by the IAEA for environmental swipe 
sampling.  The substrates were then dried and inserted into irradiation rabbits.  The 
rabbits were assigned random numerical identifiers.  While this was not a blind study in 
the truest sense, efforts were made to ensure that the nuclide concentrations were not 
obviously known during analysis. 
 The following protocol, which had been optimized by experiments prior, was 
used to analyze the sample series.  
1. Background detector measurements were taken.  This involved taking 
gross neutron counts over 400 second periods to ensure low detector 
background and noise.  90-second time resolved count measurements were 
also made to ensure that the background was both minimal and linear.  
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Background measurements on the order of less than 1 count per second 
ensure that the system was operating properly. 
2. Next, “sample blanks” were irradiated and counted.  The sample blanks 
consisted of cotton substrates with no fissile material added.  The blank 
samples were irradiated and counted for 90 seconds.  This was to provide 
an accurate Po measurement and to ensure that any natural background 
uranium present in the cotton material was below detection capabilities. 
3. Reference standards were then analyzed.  Due to variability in neutron 
flux over the course of the reactor cycle, basis functions were re-
determined prior to each batch of samples.  Reference standards were 
prepared and analyzed in triplicate. 
4. Samples were then irradiated.  The ideal irradiation procedures were found 
to be: irradiate for 90 seconds; decay for roughly 2 seconds; and count for 
90 seconds.  Time resolved neutron count profiles were recorded and 
saved as an ACSII file that could be imported into MATLAB and Excel. 
Following counting, the samples were returned to a lead dump-tank for decay for 
several hours and the procedure could be repeated for subsequent samples.  On average 
12-15 samples were processed per hour.  The spectra were then imported into MATLAB 
for analysis. 
 Two scripts were written in MATLAB.  The first script used the neutron emission 
profiles of the irradiated standards to determine the basis functions.  By preparing 
 97 
multiple standards, basis functions were averaged and upper and lower bounds using a 
decay time variance of 0.1 seconds were determined for 235U and 239Pu. 
 The second script took the spectral data and iteratively solved for nuclide masses 
using the range of possible basis functions and determined the best solution based on the 
minimal variance of the gross neutron count.  The script also found critical detection and 
determination limits based on the residual values for each sample. 
 
 
7.2 Results 
 The results of the final experiment showed promise for the described technique.  
As the tabulated results show, this method is unequivocally capable of measuring 
multiple fissile nuclides, simultaneously, without destructive chemical sample 
preparation.  Further, this technique successfully measured uranium concentrations in 
mixed actinide samples; this often causes analytical difficulties using advanced mass 
spectrometric techniques because of the mass-interferences that often arise due to the 
formation of hydrides. 
 Table 3 gives the final measured uranium and plutonium masses determined by 
this method.  Uncertainties are provided and have been calculated using the method 
described in Chapter 5.  The predicted nuclide masses given are the certified reference 
values; uncertainties arise from the cited uncertainty values provided by the certificate of 
analysis and measuring uncertainties in sample preparation. 
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 Also tabulated are the detection, critical, and determination limits, as calculated 
by the method previously described, for each sample.  The uncertainties given for each 
results were calculated using the expression derived in the previous chapter, with a 
convergence factor of 2, which approximately corresponds to the 95% confidence level 
of the measurements.  There were a few samples with higher uncertainties than other 
measurements; these uncertainties were driven by poor fitting statistics.   
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Table 3. Results of validation experiment 
 Certified Values Measured Values 
Sample 235U [ng] 239Pu [ng] 235U [ng] 239Pu [ng] 
1 1.821 ± 0.210 49.153 ± 0.712 < LQ 56.09 ± 1.43 
2 46.709 ± 0.215 32.294 ± 0.712 47.33 ± 1.11 32.85 ± 2.99 
3 3.431 ± 0.210 49.153 ± 0.712 2.46 ± 0.42 56.04 ± 1.45 
4 46.429 ± 0.215 73.611 ± 0.713 46.19 ± 1.55 73.31 ± 4.01 
5 15.476 ± 0.211 49.153 ± 0.712 19.02 ± 0.84 39.81 ± 2.99 
6 46.289 ± 0.215 105.905 ± 0.713 41.93 ± 1.25 109.09 ± 3.27 
7 24.720 ± 0.211 51.528 ± 0.713 22.95 ± 0.73 55.99 ± 2.01 
8 46.499 ± 0.215 49.865 ± 0.713 47.11 ± 1.78 50.52 ± 4.61 
9 0 ± 0 123.951 ± 0.713 < LQ 129.18 ± 1.42 
10 66.528 ± 0.220 0 ± 0 68.31 ± 0.44 < LQ 
11 0 ± 0 125.376 ± 0.713 < LQ 126.28 ± 1.43 
12 0 ± 0 117.778 ± 0.713 < LQ 124.60 ± 1.45 
13 105.814 ± 0.235 221.783 ± 0.715 110.07 ± 3.48 203.76 ± 8.82 
14 105.324 ± 0.235 116.353 ± 0.713 98.78 ± 3.47 126.74 ± 8.82 
15 123.251 ± 0.235 116.828 ± 0.713 124.14 ± 4.25 110.89 ± 10.75 
16 70.799 ± 0.222 47.491 ± 0.712 67.07 ± 2.17 54.57 ± 5.55 
17 141.739 ± 0.253 23.983 ± 0.712 136.03 ± 0.57 25.12 ± 1.58 
18 0 ± 0 20.184 ± 0.712 < LQ 19.63 ± 1.42 
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 There are a few key observations that can be made in light of the results tabulated 
above.  First and foremost, delayed neutron activation analysis is capable of determining 
multiple fissile nuclide masses within a precision of approximately 5-10% for 235U and 
239Pu.  This suggests that this method is currently capable of acting as a screening method 
of evaluating collected materials for concentrations of multiple fissile materials, at 
concentrations greater than the determination limits given in table 4.  This is an important 
result that will have very meaningful consequences if a large batch of samples ever needs 
to be processed quickly.  Such a scenario is imaginable in the event a large scale nuclear 
incident, when the quantity of collections would quickly overwhelm the mass 
spectrometry capabilities of the IAEA Network of Laboratories.  This method would 
allow for samples to be quickly analyzed in order to provide a baseline understanding of 
the material of analysis.  Because DNAA is nondestructive, samples of interest could 
then be analyzed using more precise techniques, such as mass spectrometry.   
 The second observation that can be made from this data set is than in instances 
where mj is approaching the detection limits of the system, mi will be overestimated.  
This seems to be an unavoidable consequence of estimating masses from the linear model 
and, as seen in sample 1, when a resultant mass of zero is calculated, there is a chance 
that if there is only an undetectable concentration that other nuclide masses will be 
overestimated.   
 Also found in this sample set were the critical, detection, and determination limits 
for each sample.  These results are tabulated below in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Measured detection limits 
 235U 239Pu 
Sample 
Critical 
Limit 
[ng] 
Detection 
Limit 
[ng] 
Determination 
Limit 
[ng] 
Critical 
Limit 
[ng] 
Detection 
Limit 
[ng] 
Determination 
Limit 
  [ng] 
1 0.0691 0.1722 1.1913 0.1937 0.4828 3.3483 
2 0.1122 0.2669 1.475 0.3018 0.7187 3.9847 
3 0.0512 0.133 1.0799 0.1465 0.3793 3.0557 
4 0.1044 0.25 1.4304 0.2822 0.6766 3.888 
5 0.0613 0.1554 1.1588 0.1728 0.4378 3.2494 
6 0.0907 0.2199 1.344 0.2466 0.598 3.6486 
7 0.0858 0.2093 1.3171 0.233 0.5681 3.5594 
8 0.0438 0.1172 1.0524 0.125 0.3331 2.9578 
9 0.000587 0.0228 0.7975 0.0016 0.0622 2.1722 
10 0.0965 0.2327 1.3822 0.2634 0.6352 3.7728 
11 0.000568 0.0228 0.7974 0.0016 0.062 2.1698 
12 0.000563 0.0221 0.7734 0.0016 0.0622 2.1752 
13 0.1214 0.2869 1.5253 0.3421 0.8083 4.2816 
14 0.0811 0.1989 1.2801 0.2319 0.5672 3.6099 
15 0.12 0.2841 1.5254 0.3248 0.7696 4.1408 
16 0.082 0.201 1.2939 0.2230 0.547 3.527 
17 0.0343 0.0959 0.9791 0.0972 0.2716 2.7599 
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These measured detection capabilities provide insight to the potential applications of this 
technique.  The average determination limit of 235U was found to be 1.20 ng.  Similarly, 
the average determination limit of 239Pu  was 3.31 ng.  These lower limits of detection 
were driven by fitting errors to the measured spectrum.  For samples that had smaller 
fitting errors, detection limits improved significantly; 235U had a determination limit of 
below 1 ng.   
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Chapter 8 
 Future Work 
 
The present state of this described delayed neutron activation analysis technique 
provides a solid foundation for the development of a truly robust nondestructive 
analytical method for rapidly determining fissile isotopic signatures of special nuclear 
materials.  The refinement of this technique should focus on improving detection 
capabilities and the expansion of the number of fissile nuclides measurable by this 
method. 
 
8.1 Secondary Basis Functions 
 The two primary basis functions are those for 235U and 239Pu, as these two 
materials are the primary fissile components of any special nuclear material.  However, 
the practical applications of this method rely on the formulation of other, secondary basis 
functions.  Many of the assertions made in developing a mathematical treatment of a 
delayed neutron emission profile to ascertain individual nuclide masses stipulate that the 
method is only valid if the model chosen adequately accounts for all possible fissile 
nuclides in the analyte.  The model used in this work has only two basis functions and 
will only accurately determine 235U and 239Pu in samples that do not contain other fissile 
constituents.  This poses a problem for the analysis of most real-world materials.  As 
such, the next step in the further development of this technique is to account for auxiliary 
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fissile nuclides that can reasonably be expected to be present in materials that contain 
235U or 239Pu, the most imperative of which is 241Pu.   
 The formulation and incorporation of a 241Pu basis function is a critical next step 
in the development of this method for two reasons.  First, 241Pu is expected to be present 
at some concentration in all samples that contain measurable quantities of 239Pu.  The 
materials and standards analyzed to date did contain trace amounts of 241Pu, but because 
of the age of the material and the relatively short half-life of 241Pu of 14.35 years, these 
concentrations were well below detection capabilities of the method.  Not accounting for 
the presence of all possible fissile plutonium isotopes in an analyzed material, however, 
will greatly add to the uncertainties of the determined nuclide masses and potentially 
introduce errors, which may falsify the results.  Secondly, plutonium isotopic ratios are 
an important measurement in many applications of nuclear forensics.  This delayed 
neutron activation analysis technique may very well prove to be the most effective 
method of determining 241Pu.  As a low-energy beta-emitter, 241Pu is inherently difficult 
to detect and quantify by means other than mass spectrometry.  This DNAA method 
could prove invaluable for the measurement of the 241Pu/239Pu ratio.  Because of its half-
life of only 14.35 years, the 241Pu/239Pu ratio provides a potential age-dating mechanism 
for the assay of unknown nuclear materials.  Additionally, the concentration of 241Pu 
provides insight into not only the burnup of assayed discharged nuclear fuel but also the 
originally intended use of the plutonium material. 
 This project has focused on the analysis of material that contains both uranium 
and plutonium components.  Generally speaking, that is to say that these materials 
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primarily would be derived from one of three sources.  Those sources include: discharged 
light water reactor (LWR) fuels, which produce plutonium as a function of burnup, by the 
neutron capture reactions of 238U; reprocessed spent nuclear fuel, which can also include 
fresh mix-oxide fuels; and weapons-grade plutonium, formed by chemically separating 
plutonium from low-enriched uranium irradiated at low burnups.  Like other plutonium 
isotopes, 241Pu is a common byproduct of the irradiation of 238U.  While its production 
rate in a reactor assembly is significantly lower than that of 239Pu, 241Pu has a thermal 
fission cross-section of nearly one-and-a-half times that of 239Pu.  This is significant in 
terms of its possible contribution to the delayed neutron emission spectrum of an 
irradiated sample material.  It is also an important stipulation that any material containing 
239Pu likely contains 241Pu as well.  This is a result of the difficult nature of plutonium 
isotope separation.  Currently, 239Pu enrichment techniques are not capable of complete 
separation of heavier plutonium nuclides.  Consequently, one would expect to find 241Pu 
in any plutonium sample. 
 In order to measure 241Pu and to adequately account for its presence in most real-
world samples containing 239Pu, a basis function describing the neutron detector response 
will have to be defined, as was done for 235U and 239Pu.  This will require procuring an 
isotopically certified plutonium reference material containing 241Pu.  Of the commercially 
available plutonium reference materials, even those enriched with respect to 241Pu contain 
considerable concentrations of 239Pu.  However, as long as the 239Pu basis function is 
defined prior to 241Pu this will not pose any problems.  The 241Pu basis function would 
simply be found as the residual count rate between the expected 239Pu contribution and 
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the measured delayed neutron emission profile of the irradiated standard.  The procedure 
of determining the 241Pu basis function is similar to the procedure carried out to find the 
two primary basis functions; however, it remains an important objective in the refinement 
of this method.  Similarly, additional basis functions of other fissile nuclides could be 
formulated, provided that an appropriate reference material is available. 
 The utility in developing the capability to quantify other fissile nuclides is 
particularly apparent in the assay of discharged nuclear fuel, which contains a significant 
number of anthropogenic fissile nuclides.  Contributions to the delayed neutron emission 
spectrum of an irradiated sample from 242mAm, 243Cm, and other trace fissile constituents 
of discharged LWR fuel would have to each be accounted for in order for this DNAA 
technique to be applicable to such complex sample matrices.   
 There are two practical limitations on adding any secondary basis functions to the 
model.  The first is the availability of an isotopically pure material that can be used to 
describe the basis function for a given fissile nuclide.  Difficulties that have arisen due to 
the unavailability of an adequate 241Pu material indicate that this is a nontrivial 
stipulation.  The other limitation, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4, is that the delayed 
neutron intensity regressors for each nuclide must not be collinear, and they must be 
differentiable within the capabilities of the system.  This means that not only must the 
description functions be independent, but also their differences must be large enough to 
be resolved by DNAA.  The sensitivity of the method to resolve similarly shaped delayed 
neutron decay curves dictates the eventual limit of this technique.  However, this 
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limitation can be estimated from known delayed neutron emissions data for multiple 
fissile nuclides. 
 The limiting sensitivity of DNAA can be expressed as a function of the 
unaccounted contributors to the delayed neutron emission spectrum.  These contributors 
have been defined previously as the residual errors between the measured spectrum and 
the fitted basis functions.  Generally, these errors are primarily caused by noise in the 
detector system; other causes are high background radiation incident on the detector array 
or random processes that cannot be attributed for in the linear model.  Consequently, the 
generalized description of the differences between the neutron emissions profiles must be 
greater than the detector resolution, defined here as the squared-residual values between 
the expected and measured neutron emission profiles.  This is given as equation 103: 
 𝑃! − 𝑃! > !!!         (103) 
where 𝑃! is the normalized basis vector for fissile nuclide i 
R2 is the residual errors between the measured and fitted delayed neutron emission 
spectrum of the mixed nuclide sample 
y is the neutron emission factor, as previously defined, to normalize the residuals with 
respect to total neutrons emitted 
 The basis vectors must be normalized so that the expected number of neutrons 
emitted is equivalent for each basis vector, otherwise this expression would not hold true.  
Because the neutron emissions profiles have yet to have been empirically measured, the 
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delayed-neutron decay data can be used to approximate the measured delayed neutron 
spectra for fissile nuclides.  Using this data, the normalized emission profile can be 
expressed as the superposition of the decay of all precursor nuclides, which is often 
approximated as the sum of six groups 
 𝑃! = !!! 𝑒!!!!!!!!         (104) 
where βi delayed neutron fraction in the ith delayed neutron group; β is the total delayed 
neutron fraction, defined as the ratio of the expected number of delayed neutrons to the 
total neutrons released per fission.  This time-depended neutron source expression can be 
used to determine whether the delayed neutron emission profile of a given irradiated 
nuclide is sufficiently unique to be resolved by DNAA. 
The difference in the expressions is shown in fig 18, below, as the shaded region 
between the two emissions profiles.  Shown here, for illustration purposes is 235U and 
239Pu. 
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Fig. 18. Difference between 235U and 239Pu delayed neutron emissions profiles 
 
This difference must be greater than the resolution of the detection system; it is not 
simply enough that the delayed neutron emissions profiles be unique, they must not be so 
similar that the method cannot distinguish them from one another.  Using the linear 
model to describe the measured neutron response, the error term is the limiting factor in 
determining the measurement resolution.  The relationship between detection error and 
the difference in the 235U and 239Pu delayed neutron emission profiles are shown in Figure 
19. 
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Fig. 19. Detector error and 235U and 239Pu difference 
 
It has been shown that this method is capable of coresolving 235U and 239Pu and the above 
figure graphically confirms that the curves are sufficiently unique.  The satisfaction of 
this condition will be the primary limiting factor in regards to how many, and which, 
nuclides will ultimately be analyzed using this DNAA technique.   
 
 
8.2 Improving Detection Capabilities 
 Beyond increasing the number of nuclides that can be analyzed using DNAA, the 
evolution of this project should certainly explore methods of improving lower limits of 
detection.  Fundamentally, in order to improve detection capabilities, methods must be 
explored that ultimately improve the neutron-counting statistics.  Because irradiations 
were performed using one of the highest steady-state neutron fluxes in the world and the 
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samples were irradiated to greater than 95% saturation, there are a limited number of 
approaches available to generate an increased delayed neutron signal to improve the 
counting statistics.   However, advanced irradiation techniques, such as employing cyclic 
irradiations and summing multiple delayed neutron spectra, should in the future be 
explored.  Cyclic delayed neutron activation analysis (CDNAA) has been explored as a 
method of increasing the measured signal-to-noise ratio for the analysis of single fissile 
nuclides (83). 
 Noise reduction methods have been employed in this work, and have been 
previously discussed.  The thorough optimization of detector components completed to 
date indicate that they are no obvious solutions to reducing the spectrum noise and 
reducing errors; however, further error reduction should be explored.  A conscious effort 
was made to develop this technique avoiding signal manipulation, such as signal 
averaging or advanced signal smoothing algorithms.  The motivation for avoiding such 
methods was to develop a DNAA technique that does not reply on curve fitting or other 
data manipulation, in order to demonstrate the validity of the regression model.  Having 
shown that formulated method is valid, future efforts may choose to implement some 
other signal smoothing techniques.   
 Finally, the decay time uncertainty must be addressed.  Having to iteratively solve 
the model from a range of possible basis functions because of sample decay time 
variability led to increased uncertainties in the measurements.  The simplest solution 
would be to couple monitors to the pneumatic transfer system tubes so that it can be 
observed when the sample leaves the reactor core (the end of irradiation) and when it 
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arrives to the detector array.  This would provide the capacity to correct for variances in 
sample decay time. 
 
 
8.4 Signature Development 
 Finally, there needs to be work that will ultimately create utility of the method.   
Once detection limits are improved, and other nuclides are capable of being measured, 
the specific isotopic ratios of greatest interest that can be measured by this method need 
to be defined.  If the greatest utility of this DNAA method is to attribute derivatives of 
discharged nuclear fuel, then expected isotopic signatures that can be used to identify 
initial fuel composition or reactor type must be found in order to fully appreciate the 
utility in this method.   
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Chapter 9 
 Conclusions 
 
 The DNAA technique described here represents a new and powerful 
nondestructive analytical method for evaluating the fissile isotopic composition of special 
nuclear materials.  A method of analyzing a single delayed neutron emission profile 
following irradiation at ORNL’s High Flux Isotope Reactor has been developed for the 
quantification of each of the contributory fissile components in a sample.   
 The goal of this work was to address the imminent need for a fast and reliable 
analytical method for the assay of nuclear material; current analytical techniques rely too 
heavily on destructive methods, which are laborious and time intensive.  To develop such 
a technique, this work sought to revisit the notion that delayed neutron activation analysis 
is capable only of quantifying fissile nuclides in samples containing only one fissile 
component.  The existing delayed neutron counting facility at HFIR was modified so that 
a time resolved delayed neutron emission profile of irradiated samples could be recorded.  
The acquired delayed neutron spectrum was then mathematically described as a linear 
combination of βn-decay of each contributing fissile component.  As such, ordinary least 
squares regression was then employed to estimate the masses of each fissile component 
present in the sample.   
 In order to validate and substantiate the described method, DNAA and the 
postulated spectral analysis was performed to quantify trace concentrations of 235U and 
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239Pu in a series of samples prepared using isotopically certified standard reference 
materials.  Appropriate basis functions were formulated for 235U and 239Pu and 
incorporated into a multielement regression model.  Samples containing various 
concentrations of 235U and 239Pu were irradiated and analyzed.  This experiment set 
confirmed the validity of the described method.  The measured nuclide masses agreed 
with the known nuclide masses, generally with a precision of within 5%.  Further, 
expressions for the detection, critical, and determination limits were derived from Curie 
detection limits.  As evident by the lowest concentration samples, the calculated 
determination adequately described the limiting concentrations of fissile material. 
 The validation experiment demonstrated conclusively that the delayed neutron 
emission spectrum can be defined as a linear combination of the neutrons emitted from 
each fissile component.  As long as the delayed neutron emission profiles are sufficiently 
unique, additional fissile nuclides can be integrated into the linear model.  However, in its 
present state, the DNAA method has been able to resolve 235U and 239Pu in binary 
mixtures of uranium and plutonium without the arduous sample preparation required by 
commonly employed destructive methods. 
 New, rapid analytical techniques must continually be developed to augment the 
destructive analytical methods relied on in many facets of nuclear forensics.  The need 
for quicker and simpler analytical techniques is currently apparent in the routine analysis 
of environmental swipe samples, but will be exacerbated in the event of a large-scale 
nuclear event, when the quantity of samples would quickly overwhelm the mass 
spectrometry capabilities of the IAEA Network of Laboratories. 
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 As such, the immediate applications of this method should begin with the IAEA 
swipe samples currently being analyzed using a classic application of DNAA, and was 
incapable of analyzing samples containing multiple fissile components.  The protocol for 
analyzing environmental swipe samples will be greatly improved with the integration of 
this new technique.  By not limiting the samples to those that contain only a single fissile 
nuclide, not only will this allow for a broader scope of materials and samples to be 
analyzed, but it would provide greater confidence the results of the samples that contain 
only a single fissile component.  This confidence comes from knowing that a second 
unknown fissile component is not present to obscure the measurements.  While the 
implementation of this technique will be greatly beneficial to the efforts at HFIR, the 
utility of this method is not limited to the NAA lab at ORNL.   
 This DNAA technique can easily be incorporated at other reactor facilities.  The 
procedure to retrofit and adapt the previous delayed neutron counting facility was 
straightforward and required only a few modifications to the existing hardware.  The 
installation of the ORTEC multichannel scaler was a cost effective and simple addition, 
which allowed for the time resolved delayed neutron profile to be digitalized so that it 
could seamlessly be imported into MATLAB for analysis.  
 As this technique is implemented at ORNL and elsewhere, further application, 
capabilities, and limitations will be realized.  What is for certain at this point is that it is 
incumbent upon the scientific community to provide analytical measurements with a 
level of certainty at a timeliness that is not currently attainable with destructive methods. 
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 The need for more advanced analytical methods is accentuated by the expansion 
of nuclear technology all over the world.  The analysis of both interdicted nuclear 
materials and effluents collected at nuclear materials processing facilities provides the 
basis for nuclear security and nonproliferation policy.  The inherently difficult nature of 
the currently employed destructive analytical methods limits the timescales that that 
information is ascertained, and consequently, how quickly important decisions can be 
made.  This novel application of DNAA has the potential to greatly advance the 
analytical capabilities of the nuclear forensics community.   
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